# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-95-147* *1 August 1995*

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**Eastern European Secret Services Reviewed**

*95CH0301A Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS in Hungarian 29 Jun 95 p 21*

[Article by Attila Ara-Kovacs: "Secret Services in Eastern Europe; Old Means, Today's Goals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The transformation fever and the fever to transform, so characteristic of the East European secret services immediately after the 1989 changes, have become things of the past by now. Most tempers have also subsided by now: people are increasingly concentrating on daily concerns presented by the system change, and the fate of those directly affected, career officers and informers who worked under "subcontracts" whenever an opportunity arose, has also been settled. They either found places for themselves in the new structure, or have put to use the experience they gained earlier to acquire information that could broaden opportunities in the market economy.

Although a peculiar kind of hatred had surrounded the secret services throughout Europe prior to the system change, successor organizations were quickly established after the system change everywhere, in full agreement with a majority of the people. The way these things happened in the former GDR and in the Czech Republic was most conspicuous. In East Germany the Stasi was literally liquidated: its informers were put on the pillory, while some of its professional staff members who had been caught in the act, were taken to court. The Stasi itself was put out of its misery when the "West German" intelligence agency, the BND [Federal Intelligence Service], regarded as the Stasi's chief enemy before, seized all Stasi bases, including secret documentation and the infrastructure. In Prague the national security organization was disbanded in the early 1990's, when public pressure forced the enactment of the so-called Sunshine (transillumination) law. Nevertheless, the new organization was reestablished in a matter of months, and to top things off, the previous officer corps, and mainly the expert staff, were rehired.

Much criticism has been voiced during the past five years with respect to the reconstituted secret services in countries having the least experience with democracy. Most of these criticisms justifiably suggest a resemblance between the means used previously by, and the present goals of these secret services. Despite this resemblance, however, it would be a mistake to say that any of today's secret services in the eastern part of Europe fully resembles its predecessor. In Romania, for example, even though more than one third of today's intelligence services (the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] and the SIE [Foreign Intelligence Service]) staff members were recruited from among members of the hated Securitate of the past, the operations of the new organizations, the legally established scope of their authority, and the limited insight into these organizations provided for by law, are a far cry from the characteristics of corresponding institutions in a totalitarian systems. The same could also be said about the SBU, the Ukrainian security service.

The fact that nowhere in East Europe has anyone openly questioned whether there was a need for a secret structure whose functions could be performed by other, already existing institutions (such as the interior ministries, the foreign ministries, etc.) is characteristic of the situation, especially if one considers the prevailing economic problems. Those who work within this structure argue that maintaining the special services performed within the secret structure is indispensable because of the need to control ongoing economic processes in the private sphere, and the new challenges presented by more open borders. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the economic sphere had already developed its own specific information gathering system earlier, relying to no small extent on those who had severed their previous ties with the secret services. At the same time, the surveillance and liquidation of migration and drug trading activities is a boarder guard and enforcement function not performed primarily by the secret services.

Having recognized this fact, the funding of secret services was severely reduced recently in states belonging to the Visegrad group, and the previous functions of the secret services were reassigned to other government organizations.

In Hungary, for example, the 1995 appropriation for the civilian secret services amounts to roughly half the amount appropriated to military intelligence and to the security service, even though considering inflation, appropriations for the latter did not increase as compared to previous years' appropriations. Similar decisions were also made in Prague and in Warsaw. In the rest of the countries, however, we are witnessing centralization, rather than specialization. But anyone who thinks that this overt attempt to concentrate power could also create a more clear-cut situation from the standpoint of the secret services, is mistaken. In Romania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria, and, by now, increasingly also in Slovakia, mutually competing political, administrative, and paramilitary organizations also operate secret services. It is impossible to establish institutional controls over these organizations. All this can be explained mainly by the fact that secret services in the aforementioned countries openly serve partisan goals in power politics, in certain instances, e.g., in Romania, virtually emulating the multiparty systems of open societies. In

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addition, these organizations also assert a continuous claim of being the protectors of the "classic" aggressive nationalist ideal of the state.

Secret services operating in the countries on the fringes of Europe, evacuated by the former Soviet Union, must follow either of two paths. Assigning minimum significance to the secret service sphere has already begun in the East-Central European states.

These states endeavor to transfer the various roles played by the earlier structures to international institutions, and in this regard, try to achieve a certain "North Atlantic" cooperation. By no coincidence, large Western secret service organizations represent themselves to a significant extent in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest, and within certain limits, there is no indication that the hosts object to this presence. Barely more than a month ago, an academy providing continued training opportunities for security professionals in the region opened its doors in Budapest; it was established with the help of the FBI and the CIA.

In the rest of the East-Central European states, however, we are witnessing an absurd mixture of earlier practices. In Bucharest, Virgil Mahgureanu, the head of the secret services, openly declared that he regards the royal Suguranta of the period between the two world wars as his ideal, and that he endeavors to reestablish the structure of the Suguranta within today's SRI organization. General Jevgenyij Marcsuk, the head of the Ukrainian NBU is working on establishing a local version of the KGB, also agreeing with the KGB's anti-bourgeois commitment, which, at one time, represented anti-Ukrainian sentiments of course, but which can easily be applied today to counter the endeavors of Russians in the Crimea, and along the Don River.

Even the Hungarian leadership was faced with a tempting moment. Reports have it that POFOSZ [Association of Political Prisoners], some smallholders [Independent Smallholders Party], and a private company active in MIEP [Hungarian Justice and Life Party] circles attempted to establish control over the civilian secret services, instilling in the organization the pre-1945 political and social atmosphere at the level of lumpen [proletarian] aspirations. As suspicions were confirmed later, the most active members of the aforementioned companies were informers of the former III/III division, who manifested great passion to simply promote themselves from being occasional informers to professionals holding secure jobs. Fortunately, the initial laxity of the Antall government did not last long: the secret service rid itself from these people while Andras Galszecsy served as minister.

The secret services in the Balkan region are true reflections of the society in which they operate. Under the pretext of controlling corrupt entanglements, each of the secret services has a profound interest in taking advantages of available opportunities. Personal interdependencies, too, increasingly reflect family ties; this once again goes to prove that in the absence of stable conditions, the clan outlook has been legitimized in these states. (Franjo Tudjman appointed his son, Miroslav Tudjman to head the Croatian secret service. The head of one of the most important Romanian secret service formations, "SPP," [Guard and Protection Service], the so-called defense service, is Major General Dumitru Iliescu, the cousin of head of state Ion Iliescu. The list of names could go on.)

In the aforementioned countries, people want to constrain the character of secret services inherited from the earlier communist decades only in principle. In contrast, however, people approve of the active involvement of the secret services in what amounts to mostly a popular perception only: averting alleged external threats, and threats posed by minorities residing in the country. For this reason, most people are prepared to tolerate instances, in which these secret organizations occasionally transgress the rules of democracy, restricting constitutionally guaranteed civil rights more or less.

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### Appeals Court Upholds Ilir Hoxha's Sentence

*95P20935A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 1 Jul 95 pp 1-2*

[Article by ZERI I POPULLIT correspondent: "Yesterday in the Court of Appeals; The Court Is Adjourned in the Ramiz Alia Case and the Court Hands Down a Decision in the Ilir Hoxha Case"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Yesterday, the trial of Ilir Hoxha was held, without the presence of the latter. Ilir Hoxha had been sentenced, under Decision No. 669 of 8 June 1995, by the court of the first instance in Tirana, because of an interview which he gave to the newspaper MODESTE, in which, according to the ruling of this court, he incited hatred among portions of the population, revenge, etc. Yesterday, the lawyer A. Ristani rejected the accusations against Ilir Hoxha, claiming that the interview was only a free expression of opinion and in no way was it intended to incite hatred among portions of the population. On the contrary, lawyer Ristani said in his argument for the defense: "Ilir Hoxha called for reconciliation and, especially, for an end to the misery of blood revenge." In regard to blood revenge toward portions of the population, Ristani used the words used by Ilir Hoxha in the interview: "I am not for blood revenge, only for justice." Ristani called the sentencing of Ilir Hoxha "unfounded and unjustified" and more like a political decision, which, as the lawyer stressed, is the reason why the case of Ilir Hoxha was cited by the Juridical Commission of the Council of Europe on the eve of Albania's admittance to this council a couple of days ago. "I am asking for freedom for the client whom I am defending," Ristani concluded.

The prosecutor Petrit Duka defended the accusation, asking that the ruling of the court of the first instance, which sentenced Ilir Hoxha to deprivation of freedom for one year, be upheld. After hearing both parties, the court decided to hand down the ruling on Monday afternoon.

### Hoxha Begins Serving Sentence

*95P20934A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 4 Jul 95 p 1*

[Article by B. M.: "Ilir Hoxha Changes His Residence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday at 2 P.M., after the Court of Appeals handed down its ruling, the son of the former dictator Enver Hoxha became a resident of Unit 313, to which he was escorted in a blue police car immediately after the court session which upheld the decision of the court of the first instance.

Ilir Enver Hoxha was sentenced one month ago to a year in prison because—according to the Albanian organs of justice—in an interview in the newspaper MODESTE, he committed the penal act of "inciting hatred among portions of the population." However, on the basis of the new Penal Code which went into effect on 1 June of this year, Mr. Hoxha had to remain under house arrest until the court of the second instance handed down its ruling.

The upholding of the decision of the first court by the Court of Appeals brought an end to house arrest for Ilir Hoxha and now he can join his mother, Nexhmije, who is serving an eight-year sentence.

### Hysen Selfo Becomes Chairman of Rightist League

*AU3107113795 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 29 Jul 95 p 4*

[Report by El.: "Selfo Succeeds Kola"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Changes in the leadership of the Rightist League: After six months at the head of the presidium, Chairman Kurt Kola, chairman of the Association of Former Victims of Political Persecution, has surrendered his place to Mr. Hysen Selfo, chairman of the National Front. Kola, who has led the League during a period packed with political activity, handed over the chairman's mandate during a meeting of the League yesterday, having steered this group of right-wing forces through an intensive campaign against the Bill on the Purchase and Sale of Land before it was submitted to the Albanian parliament. Selfo, the league's new chairman, will, above all, have the important task of attempting to make Albanians fully aware of the malignancy of this now-approved law. Selfo and the Rightist League, which he has now been leading since yesterday, will also have the further objective of discussing the Electoral Law with all the parties. For this purpose, Selfo and the League will perhaps issue a public invitation to all the Albanian parties who wish to take part in the 1996 elections.

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**Foreign Ministry Opposes Lifting of Arms Embargo**

*AU0108084095 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 28 Jul 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Czech Diplomacy Prefers UNPROFOR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Even after the Wednesday [26 July] resolution of the U.S. Senate, nothing has changed on the negative stand by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic regarding the lifting of the embargo on arms imports to Bosnia. This was announced yesterday by Karel Boruvka from the Press Department of the Czech Foreign Ministry. Boruvka emphasized that the Ministry continues to oppose imports of arms to the states of the former Yugoslavia, and therefore also to Bosnia. "On the other hand, we are in favor of the reinforcement of the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force] mandate, and in this spirit, we welcome the latest decision by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali aimed at simplifying the mechanism of military operations in the region," Boruvka added.

**Defense Minister Holan: Visegrad Four 'Outdated'**

*AU0108082195 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 29 Jul 95 p 2*

[CTK report: "Defense Minister Vilem Holan: The Idea of the Visegrad Four Is Outdated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—The idea of the Visegrad Four is outdated thanks to the Partnership for Peace program, which is a form of preparation for integration into NATO. Defense Minister Vilem Holan said this yesterday after meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and President Lech Walesa.

According to him, one cannot form privileged groups separately vying for integration into the Atlantic alliance. To achieve this goal, the cooperation of all interested countries is necessary, the minister said. According to him, the exchange of experience will contribute to facilitate the process of integration.

Holan spoke with Walesa and Bartoszewski also about the stand of Russia with respect to NATO. All three politicians agreed that it is "inadmissible" for any country to use its right of veto in admitting new members to the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, one must consider the completely legitimate concern on the part of Russia for its security and therefore not isolate that country, Holan added. At the same time, he spoke against any new partition of Europe. With Bartoszewski, Holan spoke also about the upcoming joint meeting of defense and foreign ministers of the two countries.

The ministerial delegation also discussed practical steps that would lead to the integration of the two countries into the European Union. In this matter, according to Holan, it will be necessary to proceed just as energetically as in the matter of integration into NATO.

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**Government Clarifies Treaty Ratification Process**

*AU3107150495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Jul 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The Office of the Government Responds To a Report in PRAVDA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, we informed our readers from Bucharest of the second day of the Slovak Government delegation's visit to Romania. Among other things, we stated the following in our article: "We have found out from well-informed sources that, during the government delegations' talks, the Slovak side offered to suspend the ratification process for the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty in the National Council of the Slovak Republic until the basic inter-state treaty between Bucharest and Budapest is signed. The Romanian side rejected this offer."

We received this response to our report from the Office of the Government yesterday:

"Issues associated with the status of the ethnic minorities in both countries, as well as the process for concluding a basic treaty with the Hungarian Republic, were also subjects of the Slovak Government delegation's talks during its official visit to Romania. The two sides briefed each other on their course of action on these issues and, within this framework, the Slovak side explained to its Romanian partner that it thought it best to ratify the framework agreement first and then accede to the ratification of the Slovak- Hungarian basic treaty. The ratification of this document comes under the jurisdiction of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and will be the subject of talks involving the parliamentary parties. The Slovak Government cannot enter into this process; therefore, it denies any claims about an alleged offer to suspend the ratification process."

(Signed) Tomas Hasala, office of the Government Press Department.

**Nagy Denies Hungarian Coalition in Danger**

*AU0108080895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jul 95 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with MOS Chairman Laszlo Nagy by Rado Stevcik; place and date not given: "The Government Should Apologize"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Following the return of the chairmen of the three Hungarian Coalition parties and their remarks about the alarm expressed by U.S. politicians, some members of the governing coalition began to call for an investigation into their activities and, as the case may be, their punishment and the approval of a law on the protection of the republic. The Slovak and U.S. Governments have issued their response. Therefore, we asked Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] Chairman Laszlo Nagy for his view on the whole episode.*

[Nagy] The reaction of the representatives of the government and the coalition parties confirms that, since last fall, it has become commonplace in Slovakia to divert the public's attention from important political events. The government is criminalizing politics and is claiming the right to absolute truth, which reminds me of the practices of the former regime. It also punished citizens for expressing a personal opinion. If I said that, in my opinion, the U.S. side will take certain important measures, I did not express myself accurately. I should have said that these will be measures on the part of certain representatives of the U.S. Congress. Irrespective of this mistake, the state administration's reaction has surprised me. The foreign minister has begun to issue threats of an investigation into our statements and activities in the United States, which is not common in democratic countries. No one, even the government, has the right to identify his interests with the state's interests. What if my steps and my interest are closer to Slovakia's state interest than those of the government?

[Stevcik] Are you not concerned that, given the current ratio of forces in parliament, you may forfeit your immunity and, possibly, your mandates?

[Nagy] I would not like to live to see deputies forfeiting their mandates in Slovakia on the basis of political conviction. Today, this concerns me; tomorrow, however, it may concern someone else. Such steps harm Slovakia's good name abroad. If this were to happen, we would lose our credit. Political issues are dealt with everywhere by discussion, by political contest; not by political criminalization.

[Stevcik] The Egyutteles chairman also apologized to the U.S. and Slovak Governments on your behalf. From the point of view of his coalition partner, what do you think of this?

[Nagy] The fact that Miklos Duray took a specific initiative upon himself is neither normal nor correct. Everyone has to be responsible for his words and deeds; it is unnecessary to tutor us. He apologized to the Slovak Government for something that did not happen, and I consider this to be a political mistake. How can an opposition politician apologize to a government that attacks the president, criminalizes the people that signed the Democratic Union's petition sheets, abolished coupon privatization, and wheels and deals with the citizens' money? How can a Hungarian minority politician apologize to a government that is preparing alternative education and is using the

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finances for ethnic culture for its own propaganda? The government should apologize to the citizens of Slovakia.

[Stevcik] Shortly afterwards, you accepted an invitation from the U.S. ambassador to a lunch that, obviously, was not only supposed to satisfy you. Will you tell us what you discussed?

[Nagy] It was a private lunch and we agreed that we would not talk about it. We will not juxtapose the lunch with what happened before and after it. I want to keep my word. As far as I am concerned, the furor surrounding my remarks—which could have affected the interests of the U.S. Administration and U.S. political representatives—has come to an end. I believe that this has also been resolved on the part of the representatives of the United States.

[Stevcik] Does Mr. Duray's initiative not endanger cooperation within the Hungarian Coalition?

[Nagy] I consider this to be a human derailment from certain principles. Therefore, I would not draw any political conclusions from it. Maybe my friend and colleague Duray is overworked and overburdened. After all, it can happen to anyone that he expresses himself incorrectly, that he takes an unfortunate step. In no way is the Hungarian Coalition in danger.

[Stevcik] Mischief makers, however, are claiming that the prime minister is already managing to break up the Hungarian minority's unity. Will there not, after all, be some truth in this?

[Nagy] I do not think that this is the case. If so, it is merely a superficial phenomenon. If Mr. Meciar were to succeed in winning over a Hungarian politician for his policy, that politician would immediately forfeit his future and would have to leave the scene. The Hungarian Coalition's policy is consistent with the alternative Slovak policy that the current opposition is promoting. Not only is Mr. Meciar trying to break up the Hungarian Coalition, he is trying to force the whole opposition, including us, onto the political periphery. What has been happening in recent weeks should be a lesson for the Hungarian politicians to coordinate their steps with the Slovak opposition more.

[Stevcik] Do you not think, however, that you can only harm democracy and Slovakia by means of such inaccuracies and infringements?

[Nagy] Our policy is a consequence and not the cause of what is going on in Slovakia. If there were no Hungarian Coalition, the SNS and the government would find other whipping-boys. Formerly, it was the Czechs; now it is the Hungarians and the opposition parties. That is, the parties in the governing coalition can only exist if they have an enemy that they want to destroy.

### Hofbauer Criticizes 'Very Biased' U.S. Reports

*AU0108080995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 29 Jul 95 p 2*

[Report by TASR: "Compatriots in the United States Allegedly Sent the Disparaging Articles to R. Hofbauer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—What the mass media in the United States reports on Slovakia is "very biased and bears the all too characteristic script of creators who are not amiably inclined toward Slovak statehood," said R. Hofbauer, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Committee for the Economy, Privatization, and Enterprise, yesterday. The contents of the letter that, in this context, he sent to U.S. Ambassador T. Russell stemmed from reports from Slovak compatriots living in the United States. He received from them a number of articles from the U.S. press. As citizens of the United States, they were "profoundly shocked and offended by them because they were disparaging with regard to Slovakia and deprecating with regard to the legitimate Slovak Government," emphasized R. Hofbauer.

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**Kovacs on Conditions Influencing Foreign Policy**

*AU0108082295 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 29 Jul 95 p 7*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Margit Kocsi; place and date not given: "Hungary Is Interested in Conciliation—Laszlo Kovacs on the South Slav Crisis, the Possibility of Visa Requirements, and Relations With Neighbors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Foreign Ministry carries on its activities under the notion of continuity and opening. The ambassadors' conference at the beginning of the week gave an excellent opportunity to draw up a balance sheet, to look at the prospects, and for the ministry's officials, to assess the main lessons and challenges influencing Hungarian foreign policy's room for maneuver. Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs gave an interview to MAGYAR NEMZET on these issues.

[Kovacs] The changes in international conditions that have taken place in the past year have positively and negatively affected Hungary's foreign policy room for maneuver. Among the positive factors, I would mention that the extension of euro-atlantic integration seems to have become irreversible. It has been decided both in the EU and in NATO that they would open toward Central Europe, although the time, the methods, and the foreign and internal effects are still being debated. On the other hand, the protraction of the South Slav crisis has been a negative factor. The fact that the war is still continuing in Bosnia is in itself a security risk for Hungary because all military conflicts can possibly spread. We have to expect more refugees, significant losses owing to the Yugoslav UN embargo, and we cannot ignore the Hungarian minority living in the South Slav area, either.

[Kocsi] Has the domestic background influenced foreign policy and are you planning any changes of direction?

[Kovacs] The domestic background determines the priorities and concrete tasks of foreign policy. In the coming period, economic diplomacy will probably come even more to the forefront because establishing the budget balance and launching modernization are Hungary's most important issues. To achieve this, we need export markets, diverse sources for purchasing, and a large amount of foreign capital. In this work, we can rely on the results of the past year, when foreign policy did everything that was in the country's interest and was possible within the international room for maneuver. We have come closer to the euro-atlantic community and, in spite of the unfavorable tendencies that have appeared in the situation of the Hungarians living over the border, all in all, relations with our neighbors have improved. Hungary's image has been improved by the fact that it has contributed to the region's stability over the past year rather than increasing instability or uncertainty. At the ambassadors' conference, we expressed the need for Hungarian foreign policy to take a step forward in the direction of those developing countries with which we already have contacts, but our cooperation is way below what is possible. We would like to take this step forward selectively. Rather than opening toward every country, from Latin America to South-East Asia, at once, we will concentrate on those that are politically and economically stable and offer promising possibilities from the point of view of Hungarian interests. Naturally, this does not mean that the ambassadors will have to make concrete deals; however, they will have to be active in respect of Hungarian economic interests. The same is done by leaders of foreign representations in Hungary, including the ambassadors of some of the most highly developed countries, who try to use their influence in the interest of some serious business deals.

[Kocsi] Returning to the South Slav crisis, if NATO joined in the fighting in Bosnia, would this influence Hungary, for example, through the AWACS aircraft?

[Kovacs] Hungary's stance on the South Slav crisis is determined by two factors. On one hand, we would like this war to end as soon as possible and we would not by any means like it to spread. We would not want the arms embargo, which is also imposed on Bosnia, to be lifted in the coming period or the UN peacekeeping forces to be withdrawn, because this would necessarily mean a spread of the crisis. At the same time, in addition to being interested in the weapons being silenced, Hungary is also interested in achieving a real settlement between the peoples of the region and a peace based on just foundations. However, if this necessitates the involvement of military force to curb certain aggressive intentions, we also agree with the use of international force, even under the aegis of NATO.

[Kocsi] NATO is expected to decide on the conditions for its expansion in the autumn. Does Hungary have a chance to influence this? In which areas are we behind? When and how will we be able to meet the requirements?

[Kovacs] Hungary's NATO membership depends on two factors. First, when and whether it meets the membership requirements. The other factor is whether NATO is willing to accept Hungary. NATO membership has certain general political conditions, for example, multiparty parliamentary democracy, a constitutional state, and a market economy. Hungary has already met these, and this is also recognized by NATO. Another group of requirements are specifically military ones. These are

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civilian control over the army, the clarity of the military budget, the coordination of defense planning with that of NATO, and the willingness and ability to cooperate and to be linked, which mainly means the ability to make the communications and control systems compatible. It also has to be seen that it is easier and cheaper to meet Hungary's security requirements as a NATO member than outside NATO. However, NATO will also assess the possible external—especially Russia's—reactions to NATO's expansion. This aspect points beyond Hungary's preparation and indicates that, although it is easier to meet the conditions of NATO membership than those of the EU, our membership also depends on factors that are outside our influence.

[Kocsi] Can Russia prevent Hungary from joining NATO?

[Kovacs] In my view, not directly, because Russia does not have the right of veto. NATO also emphasizes this, but I am sure that it will, to a certain extent, take Russia's position into consideration. President Yeltsin has told Prime Minister Gyula Horn that if Hungary joined NATO, it would not have a negative effect on bilateral relations, which is encouraging. We emphatically stress that Hungary is not seeking protection against some kind of military threat in NATO, because it does not perceive any threat. It would like to join because, in this region, only NATO's expansion can establish the most important international conditions for security and stability and Hungary would like to be a beneficiary of as well as a contributor to this process.

[Kocsi] Horn's suggestion regarding the introduction of visa requirements has created some surprise. Is it possible that this is in connection with our intention to join the EU?

[Kovacs] Only those were surprised who thought that it was he who decided to introduce visas. This was not the case. It is the government's obligation to suppress negative developments that arise with the expansion of international contacts and to avoid organized crime, the drugs trade, human trafficking, illegal employment, or the dangers of international terrorism that threaten the country's internal order, security, and economic interests. Very many means can be used in this area, the introduction of visas being only one possibility. This can also have some negative effects, for example, in contacts and travelling, including the opportunities for Hungarians in the neighboring countries to maintain contacts. It is not at all Hungary's intention to limit normal human contacts. The EU very strictly protects its own community. It is also true that Hungary is heading for the EU and if, according to our hopes, it becomes an EU member by 2000, the issue of border control with neighbors that do not join will be raised. Therefore, it is not our intention for Hungary to get into the EU or NATO to the detriment of its neighbors. It is in our interest for as many countries of the region and our immediate neighborhood as possible to meet the membership requirements.

[Kocsi] What are the effects of domestic extremist phenomena on our chances for European integration? Could diplomatic relations be broken off between Hungary and Romania because of the education law? Do you have information on which international organizations have declared the Romanian language law fascist?

[Kovacs] A well known Hungarian politician [Independent Smallholders Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan] has indeed suggested breaking off diplomatic relations. This could only have had a domestic political goal and he did not take the probable consequences of a step like this into consideration. He does not consider, for example, that this would not at all improve the situation of Hungarians living beyond the border and would only satisfy those political forces that are already working on making bilateral relations as bad as possible. During my latest Romanian visit, in addition to thoroughly examining bilateral relations and making proposals on expanding our relations, I also explained our concern over the education law to all my negotiating partners: President Iliescu, Prime Minister Vacariou, chairmen of the two houses of Parliament, and to my counterpart Foreign Minister Melescanu. I do not know of any organizations calling the Romanian education law fascist.

[Kocsi] Both with Romania and Slovakia, the developments of recent days seem to justify the skeptics. In your view, is there any chance at all for an historic conciliation?

[Kovacs] It would be a mistake to forget that progress has been made in almost all areas of Romanian-Hungarian relations in the past year, although the basic treaty has not been signed. In the near future, we must also strive to expand economic cooperation and contacts between the populations and to improve the conditions for all these. This is how we can foster the process toward an historic conciliation. At the same time, the basic treaty is not a necessary condition for establishing normal relations; it is sufficient to mention Hungarian-Austrian relations as an example.

[Kocsi] At the same time, according to the indications, the lack of a basic treaty might negatively influence our chances of European integration....

[Kovacs] The West is interested in having stability and peace in this region and for only those countries of the

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region to join that do not have irreconcilable conflicts or unsettled issues with each other. It is undoubtedly true that some politicians of the euro-atlantic community look upon the basic treaty as a kind of proof of good-neighborly relations. However, the basic treaty is a means rather than an end. I am convinced that Hungary would not be reproached for the lack of the document if relations between Hungary and one of its neighbors improved noticeably and the problems were on the way to being settled. Therefore, not signing the basic treaty does not in itself reduce Hungary's chances of integration.

**Assembly Debates Government 'Secrecy Law' Draft**

*95CH0298A Budapest HVG in Hungarian 17 Jun 95 pp 92-100*

[Article by Gabor Juhasz: "Regulations on Protecting Secrets—A Closed Government System?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Apparently, the administration is forced to back off concerning several issues in the draft bill on secrecy. For instance, it will presumably be unable to have parliament approve that any given cabinet classify its "internal" documents for 80 years, with the exclusion of any subsequent investigation.*

"It is difficult to imagine (...) that the Ministry of Culture and Education, the Ministry of Labor, or the National Office of Physical Education and Sports, for instance, have secrets that must be considered state secrets," wrote Sandor Nyiri, (then) chief advisor at the Ministry of the Interior, in his article published in RENDESZETI SZEMLE's [Law Enforcement Review] issue 1992/11 under the title "Thoughts on State and Service Secrets." Apparently, the education and interior staff—Sandor Nyiri now being one of the leaders of the latter in his position as deputy state secretary—have amply exercised their imagination. For in the draft bill on secrecy, which was introduced in parliament by the minister of the interior, there is a clause, for instance, that says that the cultural portfolio's "special ministerial statements and measures" connected with Hungarian institutions abroad can be classified for 50 years; indeed, the same may apply to "special measures and data connected with refugees in Hungary."

Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze, who introduced the bill, stated in his parliamentary speech that "in spite of its brevity (...), the bill puts and end to an era"; however, it is still an open question what the benefits of the new era will be for the country. One can only say at this time in connection with the new regulations on the protection of secrecy that Hungarian legislation would, from the aspect of procedure, take a huge step forward by passing this law—based on the draft bill. It is doubtful, however, whether there will be enough time to work out the regulations in detail during the parliamentary debates and whether the coalition will force the bill through by referring to the deadline of 30 June, which is "in violation of rights." (Without the law a situation would emerge in which, in a legal sense, state secrets would be abolished in Hungary.)

For the regulations on the protection of secrecy, introduced in 1987, will automatically expire at the end of the month. What happened was that, in connection with a proposal to make the documents of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (which was formally the legal successor of the Hungarian Workers Party and which ceased to exist in 1989) accessible to the public, statutory order 1987/5 on state and service secrets and order 17/1987 (9 June) of the Council of Ministers on the former's implementation was reviewed last year by the Constitutional Court (CC) and was found unconstitutional. Although only certain passages of these orders were objected to in the proposal, the CC established that their unconstitutionality cannot be rectified by merely "throwing out" certain passages and that the entire statute, which is "rotten to the core," must be rescinded. In their resolution 34/1994 (24 June), the constitutional justices stated that these statutes shall expire on 30 June 1995, meaning that parliament must pass new laws before then.

As is usually done in such cases, the CC also provided in its resolution some pointers for the new law. For instance, it declared unconstitutional that the present statutes allow leaders of social organizations (e.g., parties) to designate data as state secrets; that the present statutes define state secrets only by referring to examples (i.e., they assign full authority to persons qualified to classify); and that data can be classified on the basis of "other statutes" in addition to the law. It is mentioned in the CC's reasons that, according to the legal practice of Strasbourg, "the necessary limitations concerning the protection of secrets involve only areas recognized by European nations, e.g., national defense, national security, foreign relations, public order, crime prevention, confidential data of state finances, and court proceedings."

Accordingly, the government draft proposes that only government organizations (representing state power) would be given the authority to classify, both the areas of secrecy and the maximum time period of classification being specified by the law. However, it is not certain whether the bill will adhere to the CC resolution in substance as well. For the list of the areas of secrecy is rather long, consisting of 166 items (HVG [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG], 27 May 1995), and the wording is rather loose, partly because the persons designated for

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having the authority to classify (including the president, the CC's chief justice, members of the administration, and ambassadors) determined themselves, with the help of their staff, what they want to classify in the future. In other words, the draft bill is little more than a wish list (filtered by the Ministry of Interior and the administration) of future proprietors of secrets.

It is thus doubtful that new law would—merely by introducing legal changes—significantly narrow down the list of real state secrets as opposed to the present one. In the case of the police, for instance, the directive of the national police chief (which took effect on 1 October 1994, when the police law took effect) specifies 22 areas of state secrets, while the present bill specifies only 12. Although this is a dramatic change, the reason for the decrease is mainly legal technicality. For instance, protected business, and scientific and service objects (e.g., nuclear facilities), as well as information about and plans of the protection of public collections (especially those that guard the royal insignia) were eliminated from the list of 22, but this does not mean that these cannot be declared state secrets in the future; they have merely been reclassified as "general data" (that is to say, classification is not necessarily done by the police chief). The fact that the definition of the areas of secrecy is extremely vague in some places also makes it doubtful that the "secret zone" will be narrowed down. In the draft bill, twenty-eight areas of secrecy are listed in connection with national security services, but since it is stated under clause number one that "data related to the organization and operation, areas of activity, and concrete information needs of offices" (i.e., to practically everything), the other clauses are hardly necessary. The statement that data on cover intelligence activity, for instance, can be specified as state secrets is added merely for the purpose of emphasis.

However, the opposition discovered stipulations in the draft bill that can hardly be "constitutionalized" merely by changing their wording. Katalin Kurucz (MDF), for instance, criticized the draft bill in her speech, saying that even so-called "war-time statutes" would be subject to secrecy, even though a statute, by definition, cannot be secret; according to the law on legislation, a statute must be publicly announced in plain language, for the citizen to know what is expected of him by the state. (Kurucz, the MDF's keynote speaker, related an interesting example for "resolving" this contradiction. The subject of statute 1950/26, published in MAGYAR KOZLONY [Hungarian Gazette], was the Hungarian National Bank, but the subject of its secret version was "military dependents' legal responsibilities without criminality.") Miklos Gaspar (KDNP) questioned whether the Hungarian National Bank, the National Claims and Compensation Office, or the National Health Insurance Bank can be considered government agencies with corresponding authority because, according to the draft bill, they would have the authority to have "state secrets."

But the weakest clause of the draft bill is the one that was included under pressure from the Office of the Prime Minister, namely, that "data on the internal decision making processes at meetings and the organization of meetings, and data generated during the activities of the administration and its agencies" would remain state secrets for 80 years. It even contains a last-minute addition that, contrary to general practice, the classification of such documents cannot be reviewed during this period of secrecy. If the bill passes, this would mean that documents that were "closed," say, this year would remain secret until 2075, for succeeding administrations would have no authority to reclassify them (unless parliament would rescind this clause at some later time). Katalin Kurucz announced on the first day of the debate that if parliament passes the bill in its entirety and in its original form, then the MDF will appeal to the Constitutional Court. The debated proposal regarding government documents—which, even according to Istvan Laszlo Meszaros, a keynote speaker of the SZDSZ, is "out of line"—was rejected last week even by the Constitution and Justice Committee in connection with a multiparty modification proposal and, as a result, probably only war-time statutes will become secrets (although the committee unanimously declared on 24 May that "this regulation is needed in its entirety as well as in its details, and the principles of regulation are correct"). One reason why the inclusion of review secrecy in the draft bill is striking is that it was precisely the Horn-Kuncze administration that, in demonstrating the change of style of the new administration, published some unpublished resolutions of the Antall-Boros administration in a special issue of THE MAGYAR KOZLONY last year (HVG, 15 October 1994); true, only those were selected which were determined during the review as unclassified.

Of course, even if the clause on the administration's "self-secrecy" is left out of the law (which is likely), and even if definitions in the list of 166 (which Gabor Kuncze called "the most vulnerable" part of the bill) are made more exact, future practice will determine the kinds of secrecy laws Hungary will have after the main law is passed. This is well demonstrated by the 1992 law on the protection of personal data and on the accessibility of public data (which also contains only general clauses) or the law on real estate registry. For the authorities have already almost forgotten the provisions regarding accessibility but, at the same time,

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they like to refer to the protection of personal data if an "outside" person (say, a citizen) makes an inquiry. Thus, with a little exaggeration, the statute on data protection can be considered a self-goal: because, although the statute was legislated mainly to hinder an indiscriminate collection of data by the authorities, they use it as a magic device whenever they want to hide something unauthorized from the public. It is of no avail that the CC declared in its resolution 15/1995 (13 March) that the data of real estate registries are of public interest (and open to the public) and that "the real estate registry—as an inventory of national property—can fulfill its many functions only if it is based on the principle of public credibility and public accessibility." In spite of this, and in spite of the statutes on real estate registry, the practices of land offices vary: there are those that provide copies of any data, and there are others that selectively deny access, depending on who requests what data.

One thing seems to be certain: violators of state secrecy can expect more stringent actions by the authorities, mainly in the form of criminal proceedings. Although the present statute, which took effect on 1 January 1988, may be very convenient for those who classify secrets, it cannot be said that the authorities took strong measures against violators during the past years. True, there were no instances of serious violations (or they were not made public because of the "protection of secrets"). The primary explanation for this is that violations of secrecy during the past years constituted criminality only in a formal sense, while these acts' so-called danger to the public (which must be applicable for considering them criminal) have diminished or ceased.

The big question is, then, what will be the fate of an eventual "new Vegvari," i.e., a police officer or national security officer who allows a TV crew to enter the "haunt" of an intelligence service in order to inform the public (by formally violating state secrecy but at the same time providing evidence) about, say, the illegal surveillance of politicians of the opposition by this or that agency. Jozsef Vegvari was merely reprimanded in early 1991.

**Percentage of classified documents in the total number of documents (rounded to the closest .1 percent)**

| 1994 | Office | 1988 |
|---|---|---|
| Information Office | — | 100.0 |
| National Security Office | — | 90.9 |
| Office of the President | — | 77.2 |
| Secretariat of the minister who oversees civil intelligence services | — | 67.4 |
| Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders | — | 57.6 |
| Ministry of Defense | 59.1 | 33.3 |
| National Claims and Compensation Office | — | 30.4 |
| Office of the Prime Minister | 34.7 | 27.2 |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 34.8 | 24.0 |
| Office of Government Supervision | — | 19.8 |
| Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications and Water Management | 14.4 | 14.1 |
| Office of Minorities | — | 13.7 |
| National Technical Development Committee | 11.3 | 10.4 |
| Ministry of Environmental Protection and Land Development | 12.5 | 8.0 |
| State Bank Inspectorate | 0.2 | 6.0 |
| Ministry of Labor | 6.7 | 5.7 |
| Police headquarters | N/A | 5.1[1] |
| Central Bureau of Statistics | 33.4 | 4.8 |

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| 1994 | Office | 1988 |
|---|---|---|
| Ministry of Culture Education | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| Ministry of Social Welfare | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Hungarian Telegraph Office | 12.6 | 1.6 |
| Office of Business Competition | — | 1.4 |
| State Accounting Office | — | 1.1 |
| National Office of Nuclear Energy | 2.1 | 0.8 |
| Hungarian National Bank | 2.5 | 0.8 |
| Ministry of the Interior | N/A | 0.8[2] |
| Prosecutor General | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| Ministry of Justice | 2 | 0.8 |
| Ministry of Industry and Commerce | 1 | 0.8 |
| Customs and Revenue Police | 1.4 | 0.7 |
| Hungarian Academy of Sciences | 4.5 | 0.5 |
| Ministry of Agriculture | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| National Office of Physical Education and Sports | 7.2 | 0.1 |
| Internal Revenue Directorate | 1.9 | 0.0[3] |
| | | |

[1]1993 figure

[2]1988-1994 average

[3]12 of 40,612 documents

**Number of criminal proceedings for violations of secrecy (indictments in parenthesis)**

| Type of case | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994[1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State secret violation | 6 (3) | 4 (1) | 0 | 5 (1) | 3 (1) | 9 (4) | 5 (3) | 7 (1) |
| Service secret violation | 32 (24) | 0 | 0 | 3 (0) | 8 (2) | 7 (0) | 14 (5) | 7 (1) |
| Failure to report state secret violation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 (0) |
| Releasing state and military secrets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (0) | 2 (1) | 1 (0) | — | — |

[1]First half of the year.

[2]Rescinded by law 1993/XVII.

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**Morillon Advocates Gulf-War Style Intervention**

*AU0108103395 Paris AFP in English 0929 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, Aug 1 (AFP)—French Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] chief General Philippe Morillon is in favour of large-scale military intervention in Bosnia if the situation on the ground does not improve significantly, the STERN magazine to appear Thursday [3 August] reports.

In an interview with the German weekly, Morillon said that if the Rapid Reaction Force cannot produce a breakthrough in the Bosnian conflict, Western powers should launch a Gulf-war style intervention and deal with the Bosnian Serbs the same way they dealt with Saddam Husayn.

Morillon, who commanded UN peacekeepers in Bosnia in 1992-93, was thus advocating a radical shift away from the peacekeeping and humanitarian mandate which has hitherto governed UN involvement in Bosnia to direct military involvement on the side of the Bosnian Government against the Serbs.

Morillon also said a withdrawal of peacekeepers would be disastrous for Europe and the future of the Balkans.

"We would be abandoning the principles on which our civilisation is founded," Morillon was quoted by Stern as saying. "It would create a Gaza strip in the heart of Europe in which hundreds of thousands of displaced persons would dream from generation to generation of reconquering their fatherland which all that that entails: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, Islamic fundamentalism."

He also came out against a lifting of the arms embargo, saying the Serbs would give Bosnian Government forces no time to rearm and regroup. "If the embargo is lifted," he said, "it (will mean) the immediate fall of Sarajevo."

Several Islamic nations and the U.S. Senate have already backed moves for a lifting of the embargo which they argue penalizes the Moslems and gives them no chance to defend themselves.

**French Send Heavy Guns**

*AU0108070195 Paris AFP in English 2125 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ploce, Croatia, July 31 (AFP)—Four hundred soldiers equipped with artillery, including high-tech long-range heavy guns, arrived in this southern Croatian port Monday [31 July] to reinforce the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] in Bosnia. The battery includes eight 155 millimetre AU-F1 guns. It is the first time such guns, which are the most modern used by the French Army, are being used for an operation outside French territory.

The guns have a range of 27 kilometres (17 miles), sometimes greater, depending on the type of ammunition used. They are said to be able to fire two tonnes of metal in less than a minute.

The transport ship Neptune Olympique left Toulon, southern France, on Thursday, and arrived in Ploce at about 7:30 p.m. (1730 GMT) Monday. Unloading was due to continue throughout Monday night. A first convoy will leave Ploce Wednesday, and the AU-F1 guns will be driven to Mount Igman, overlooking Sarajevo, where about 1,000 men from the Rapid Reaction Force are deployed. Orders were given to put part of the force, set up to bolster the UN peacekeeping operation, on Mount Igman after two French soldiers died in two simultaneous Bosnian Serb attacks on peacekeepers earlier this month.

**Izetbegovic, Velayati View Iranian Assisstance**

*AU3107151895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[Report by Mirza Behran from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have today met in Mostar. The delegations were led by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mr. 'Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After the talks, during a news conference, which was [word indistinct] organized and which took place in a friendly and warm atmosphere, the delegations (?issued) a joint statement in which [words indistinct] that the main reason for this meeting was to discuss the military and political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the terrorist insurgence by the Serb aggressor in the protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa.

The joint conclusion was that the United Nations has experienced a total defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the occupation of these protected areas, that the tolerance of Serb aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina is unacceptable, and that the genocide of Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown the total paralysis of the institutions of the world order.

The two countries agreed that the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina is illegal and that it violates the legitimate rights of an attacked country, which is a UN member, to self-defense. They called for the lifting of the unjust embargo on arms either through the

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United Nations, unilaterally, or multilaterally by countries that will not be accomplices to the international community's passivity.

In this context, they concluded with satisfaction that the Republic of Croatia has accepted the appeal by Bosnia-Herzegovina to offer it military and all other necessary assistance, especially to defend Bihac. The two sides agreed that the crisis in this region should primarily be solved through political and diplomatic means. For this reason they criticized the Contact Group for not exerting consistent pressure on the Serb side, which has not accepted the peace plan.

It was concluded that [words indistinct] tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in solidarity in the Muslim world, [words indistinct] the a victim of aggression. In this way the (?experience) of Bosnia-Herzegovina has become an important factor of homogenization and mobilization of the broadest spectra of the Islamic countries' population.

The two delegations welcomed such positive developments, as these represent a reliable sign that the world is siding with universal and general human values.

In connection with this, it was concluded that the indifference of a few governments of Muslim countries, in terms of their passivity and insufficient involvement in this issue, is unacceptable.

During the meeting, the two sides discussed ways and means for the Islamic Republic of Iran to help Bosnia-Herzegovina to overcome this difficult period and bring the resistance to the Serb aggression to a successful conclusion. Some specific conclusions were made in this respect.

After the meeting, there was a news conference at which the journalists were addressed by Muhamed Sacirbegovic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign minister of Iran, and [words indistinct] Edhem Bicakcic. At the news conference, Iran's support for the successful cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia was emphasized.

### HVO General Views RRF, Cooperation With Army

*AU0108101795 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jul-3 Aug 95 p 8*

[Interview with Colonel General Filip Filipovic, commander of the Joint Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council, by Djuro Kozar; place and date not given: "We May Wage War for a Century, But We Will Not Give Up What Is Ours"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In mid June, Colonel General Filip Filipovic was appointed commander of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] with the Joint Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and HVO in Sarajevo. He was born in Travnik 49 years ago, and he is a highly educated and experienced officer.

[Kozar] General, before you joined the Joint Staff you were the commander of the Tomislavgrad Army District. Please, tell us how well prepared and equipped the HVO units are today for the fight against the aggressor.

[Filipovic] The HVO units were well prepared for the struggle against the aggressor and the defense of the Croatian citizens even in 1992, while today, after three years of war, they have great experience and represent a respectable force. Our units are now better equipped for offensive actions. This presupposes our being adequately equipped with technical means and properly trained as well. We are capable of going forward, and we shall do so. The HVO has shown its offensive capacity on the front at Kupres and around Livno and Grahovo. From the strategic point of view, these fronts are the easiest ones on which to strike blows against the enemy, since the region is relatively unpopulated and it is quite difficult for the enemy to bring in new forces and secure logistic support.

### Enigma of the Rapid Reaction Force

[Kozar] You were directly involved in the preparations and beginning of the offensive on those two fronts where the HVO has been quite successful. What is the situation there like at present?

[Filipovic] As for Livanjsko Polje and the breakthrough on Mt. Dinara and Mt. Sator, we really did achieve results there. We control every position overlooking Livanjsko Polje. However, Mt. Dinara extends as far as Knin. We plan to push on toward Knin as well. But Mt. Dinara is quite demanding in terms of communications. We have to dig new roads, which takes time. We, for instance, move the front line 6-10 square kilometers, after which it has to be secured logistically. On the other hand, the HVO does not want to make any hasty advances at the price of great losses in manpower. Our strategy is to move forward, but as safely as possible for our troops.

[Kozar] Is Bosansko Grahovo surrounded by HVO units?

[Filipovic] We are close to Bosansko Grahovo, indeed, but it is not surrounded by our troops. The HVO is

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not interested in taking Bosansko Grahovo, in terms of historic Croatian regions that we have to take. However, our goal is to crush the enemy and force him to treat us without arrogance. We have to soften those commanders of theirs, because they are haughty and conceited about the myth of their invincibility.

[Kozar] You have mentioned Mt. Dinara, which is being referred to as place where the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] troops are supposed to be deployed. Reportedly, their goal is to place themselves between the demarcation lines. What do you think of that force?

[Filipovic] My personal opinion is that the RRF, counting between 5,000 and 15,000 troops, has no chance of having any effect, in view of the more than 300,000 troops, counting all three armies together. On the other hand, the international community is not decisive regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, so this RRF, in view of the current situation, might be an instrument of the policy of the countries that sent it here in the first place. As for Mt. Dinara, the RRF will be able to go there when they are able to go to other places now controlled by the Bosnian Army or Karadzic's Serbs.

**(In)Congruence of Interests**

[Kozar] What is the situation like in Orasje? How capable are the HVO forces of repelling all the aggressor's attacks from the corridor, of which we have had plenty so far?

[Filipovic] In the course of this war, I have not been in Orasje myself, but, on the basis of the information we have, I can conclude that the HVO forces there are very strong. They are capable of keeping the territory they now control and, in the event of some different development, they are strong enough, thanks to the support provided by the 108th Brigade of the HVO and the Bosnian Army, to frustrate the aggressor's plans and his strategic interest in Posavina. The enemy has been pounding Orasje with all sorts of artillery weapons, but he has not been able to crush our defense, because those are local people defending their own homeland, and I also have to add that we have there good logistical support.

[Kozar] When speaking of the action to lift the blockade around Sarajevo, a Zagreb newspaper printed a statement you made, according to which the lifting of the blockade is not a priority task of the HVO. Will you, please, explain that?

[Filipovic] This statement has been taken out of the context of our broader conversation, so it may create a false impression among the readers. In the interview, from which only half of a sentence was quoted, I spoke about whether the interests of the Bosnian Army and the HVO are fully congruent. In that sense, the answer was that nobody can expect our interests to be completely identical, and there are objective differences when speaking of the primary interests of the Bosnian Army and the HVO.

It is clear that Sarajevo is the primary interest of Bosnian Army, but it is certainly not unimportant for us. It is certainly among our main goals, but it is not the paramount one, because there are other fronts that we consider more important. Sarajevo is a common goal of the Bosnian Army and the HVO, and we are working on it and will work on it even further.

[Kozar] Among the public, there has been an impression that the HVO did not provide adequate support for the Bosnian Army, particularly on Mt. Kokoska....

[Filipovic] In the action to open Sarajevo, the HVO is giving as much as it can. Expectations that the HVO will crush the enemy on every occasion are unrealistic, as if the HVO had Tornado aircraft or hundreds of tanks at its disposal. I tell you that the HVO is taking part wholeheartedly in the operations conducted in the broader area of Sarajevo and contributing to the enemy's defeat, but the total result does not depend on us.

I want to point out another thing: The Serbian aggression ought to be put to an end in terms of the minimum anticipated by the Contact Group, that is, the 49:51 ratio, and we cannot go below that. [sentence as published] No policy can force our two peoples to accept less than that. The war may last for the next 10 or 100 years, which may sound awfully to the people reading this, but basically, we must not go below the aforementioned ratio. This should be clear to Karadzic, who rejected the Contact Group plan and is now overrunning the so-called safe areas.

**Eliminating Distrust**

[Kozar] You joined the Joint Staff to take up the duty of the commander of the HVO, a duty that was performed before you by Gen. Ante Roso and Gen. Zivko Budimir. How do you assess the cooperation with the members of the Bosnian Army?

[Filipovic] We have moved from the phase of the cessation of clashes, demarcation, and the implementation of the agreement to the phase of concrete understanding. Now we are working on the reconstruction of trust among the personnel and units. This does not develop by itself, nor does it go on within the same army, for there are differences between individuals, but I guess that mutual relations are such that combat tasks will be carried out by both sides. There are nc problems in the Joint Staff's work, and we are dealing with things efficiently and expeditiously. At the moment, the United

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Nations and difficulties with it are a far greater burden on us.

[Kozar] Some HVO officers express the fear that the units and commands of the HVO might merge into the Bosnian Army, and thereby lose their identity. From where does that fear arise?

[Filipovic] It is questionable whether it is a fear or just an understanding of reality. The HVO insists on its identity, and there is no merging, nor will there be any. The question of how the joint or unique federal army will be constructed will be resolved by agreement. It is quite certain that the HVO representatives in those talks will not agree to a type of army such as the former Yugoslav People's Army. There is no dilemma here. Cooperation is necessary. Just look at the example of the Greek and the Turkish army, both of them being members of NATO, which means that, on certain levels, their commanders and units cooperate and have common goals. As for HVO personnel, I would say they do not fear that our units might merge into the Bosnian Army, because they will simply not allow that. Essentially, the HVO wants its own identity, which nobody can take away.

I would like to return to the question of trust and say that strengthening trust takes time, because the consequences of the conflict still exist, and there are still wounds and scars that have not healed yet. It is necessary for people to get to know and regard each other better, and then all the traces of suspicion will disappear.

**[Box, p 8]**

[Kozar] Could you tell us more about the arrest of the former HVO commander, Ivica Raic, who is now in the prison in Ljubuski?

[Filipovic] I have no concrete details about Raic's arrest. What I can say is that he has not been arrested because of some alleged wrongdoing while he was an HVO commander, but rather because of the well-founded suspicion that he committed a crime as a civilian, outside of military service.

Raic's merits on the HVO fronts are undisputable. He is a distinguished fighter and there is no dilemma about that. In that regard, I am convinced that HVO will not give in. However, I think that the issue is not about Raic's contribution to the defense of Kiseljak and other places, or about some other circumstance of war. Most probably, his arrest has taken place for some other reason, which is a matter for the judicial bodies, about which we will be known more when the investigation is over.

[Kozar] There are many people who have linked Raic's arrest with elimination of extremists.

[Filipovic] I think that the term "extremists" is inappropriate. One side should not speak of extremists on the other side. If this is done, then one should certainly speak of extremists on one's own side, who are then no longer referred to as extremists, but rather as individuals who committed certain omissions, transgressions, or criminal acts, and as such they should be brought to justice.

### Ministry Appeals to UNHCR, WHO for Help

*AU3107185895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Health of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has sent an appeal to Sadako Ogata, high commissioner for refugees, and Mr. (?Asalo), director of the World Health Organization, concerning the extreme difficult situation in which the health service and the population of the protected area of Bihac have found themselves. The appeal states the following:

According to the latest information, the situation in the hospitals is dramatic, as there are no necessary medicines to treat the wounded and sick. There are no anesthetics, bandages, gauze, [word indistinct], antibiotics, antitetanus serum, [word indistinct], or other medicines necessary for urgent medical interventions.

There have been several cases of death caused by the shortage of the above-mentioned and other medicines.

At the same time, a convoy of the International Red Cross carrying necessary medicines and medical kits that was stopped by the aggressor has been standing on the road to the Bihac region for several days, the appeal for help states among other things.

### UN: Progress on Convoys for Sarajevo, Gorazde

*AU0108111995 Paris AFP in English 1054 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Aug 1 (AFP)—Aid convoys to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo and the eastern enclave of Gorazde have made "slight progress" in getting supplies through to the Serb-besieged areas, a UN spokesman said Tuesday [1 August].

But aid workers have been unable to get supplies into the northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac, where UN depots are empty, said Ron Redmond, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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Last week nine convoys carrying 1,458 tonnes of supplies reached Sarajevo "which was the best week we have had for a long time," Redmond said.

The capital's population needs 4,600 tonnes each month.

The UNHCR was Tuesday awaiting the go-ahead from Bosnian Serbs for four other trucks carrying 754 tonnes, chiefly of food, to enter Sarajevo.

All these convoys have taken the route known as "Sierra One" and not the Mount Igman route overlooking the capital, Redmond said.

UNHCR convoys have also managed to enter the UN-declared safe area of Gorazde, Redmond said, adding that there "has been some slight progress on convoys in these areas."

A total of 245 tonnes of aid have reached Gorazde in the past three weeks, short of the 772 tonnes needed monthly.

Redmond reiterated that in Bosnia, an estimated 12,000 to 13,000 Serbs have been displaced from Glamoc and Grahovo, the two Serb towns that fell to Croat forces Friday.

Some 40 refugees were reportedly in Knin, the stronghold of Croatia's secessionist Krajina Serbs, but Redmond said he could not confirm the figure of about 1,000 refugees given by Serb authorities.

**Commenatry on Peace Plans, RRF, Split Accord**

*AU3107135495 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jul-3 Aug 95 p 2*

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Signatures Tested"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The famous Murphy's law says: "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong." That is exactly what is happening in Bosnia. The fall of Srebrenica and the massive exodus of its inhabitants caused much more serious consequences than the West expected. It is now clear that the peace plan of the famous Contact Group is a thing of the past. Its collapse does not merit any lamenting, because apart from a mechanical division of the territories, with percentages decided as if the point in question had been the distribution of corn meal, nothing in that plan was either logical or clear. The international community has never had a plan for Bosnia as a whole. Therefore every attempt it has made to redirect the situation by tactical moves has in fact lead to the prolongation of the war.

Further proof of that can be seen in the controversy over the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Forces [RRF]. It is no longer important what their real purpose is, but what the individual attitudes are toward their presence. Everybody knows that the situation in Bosnia essentially changes with the engagement of more than 12,000 new troops. The analysts draw our attention to the fact that it is not only a question of their number and weapons. They are elite troops, whose members have been trained to inspire general fear. Allegedly, they are always ready to kill before they let someone kill them. Karadzic threatens that he will attack them wherever they stand in his way, even if they try to fly by helicopter to Gorazde. It would be interesting to watch that movie. Karadzic's threat is not without its own logic: It is better to destroy those guys in the air than to wrestle with them in the hills around Gorazde.

The citizens of Sarajevo would consider soldiers with such a reputation to be desirable fellow-citizens, but three years ago. Now, they are arriving with a big delay. If they open the Igman road, the picture of the Bosnian war will not change a lot. But even that is better than nothing. The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina also express their distrust of such a concentration of RRF. Allegedly, their mandate is disputable. The dispute, however, is very confused. Prime Minister Silajdzic has one version, the president of the Federation Kresimir Zubak has a second, and the president of the State Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, has a third. A rather original theory in this regard was expounded by Mr. Zubak. He claims that there is a Franco-British conspiracy, whose objective is to break the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Zubak finds support for his theory in the fact that the French and the British generals think that they are not obliged to ask his consent to the arrival and deployment of the RRF.

Meanwhile, it would be more precise to state that the Federation is its own worst enemy, because its internal efficiency is less than modest. There is no country in the world that has two armies. It is a paradox that it so happens that an attempt has been made to do something, at least in that domain, but the joint operations around Sarajevo yielded fewer results than expected. At the moment, the declaration on the expansion and strengthening of cooperation in defense between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted in Split last Saturday, is being put to the test. The agreement was signed after the renewed Serb offensive on Bihac. It seems that this agreement has received more attention in Zagreb than in the Sarajevo media. The Croatian Television commentary, in which the message to the Bosniaks is that they should turn to their only natural ally, because nobody else will help them, was accompanied by several takes shot on the occasion of the recent military review at Jarun [Zagreb artificial lake].

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The actual range of this message will, perhaps even tomorrow, be checked in the battlefield. Croatian president Tudjman usually also calculates something he calls "international circumstances" into his decisions. He will probably stick to that when the Split Declaration is put to a practical test. Anyway, it would be tedious to try to convince Tudjman of something he knows very well, too. It is stupid even to think that he, for example, does not know how significant Bihac is for the security of Croatia, or what it means if the historical border on the Drina River moves westward. Tudjman, presumably, needs no adviser to understand the geography of this area, and he needs no explanation of where the road from Belgrade to Knin goes. If, however, he was doing the opposite, that means that his vision of Croatia, at least in terms of its shape and borders, is a little strange.

Everybody noticed that the atmosphere on the occasion of the signing of the Declaration at villa Dalmacija was not particularly pleasant. Those from the second row, among whom was also General Rasim Delic [commander of the General Staff of Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army], were applauding, while Tudjman and Izetbegovic were more than restrained. This impression does not necessarily mean anything, but it was similar to the occasion of the signing of the Washington Treaty. "One should not even think that the Declaration will remain just a dead letter," the commentator of Zagreb VJESNIK concludes. It is now high time his suggestion were followed.

**Akashi: Croatia Poised To Launch Attack**

*AU0108072995 Paris AFP in English 0648 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Aug 1 (AFP)—Croatia is poised to launch an attack on Croat Serb separatist forces, UN special envoy for the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi said Tuesday [1 August].

"They seem very prepared to attack, the danger of a military offensive is still there, we are watchhing the situation with great concern," he added, referring to the Croatian Army troops massed along the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia.

**Croats Shell Border Regions**

*AU3107140295 Paris AFP in English 1312 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, July 31 (AFP)—Croat forces on the offensive in south Bosnia conducted a "massive" shelling campaign of Serb-held border regions of Croatia, UN officials said Monday [31 July] as Bosnian Serb generals who have threatened to retake lost ground met nearby.

Attempting to pressure breakaway Serbs holding territory in Croatia, regular Croatian (HV) and Bosnian Croat [Croatian Defense Council] (HVO) forces have kept up "massive artillery and mortar shelling against RSK (Republic of Serb Krajina) border villages over the last 16 hours," Chris Vernon, a UN spokesman said Monday.

Serb forces in Bosnia responded with a "violent" bombardment of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc, the two Serb towns that fell to the Croats on Friday. Cannon fire and rockets were fired onto the area at first light Monday wounding one soldier and a civilian, an HVO official said.

The attack follows a pledge made Sunday by the Krajina Serbs to withdraw some troops from the Bihac enclave, where Bosnian Government troops were pushed onto the defensive deep inside the pocket.

The Krajina Serbs also said they would allow monitoring of the border but only where there is fighting in the south. No agreement was signed by the Serbs. [passage omitted]

Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman rejected what amounted to simply an offer from the Serbs to withdraw from Bihac in an attempt to defuse mounting tensions.

The UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi who returned from Knin with the Serb offer was due to write to Tudjman Monday asking him to reconsider the offer, UN officials said.

Vernon said the Croat attack was aimed at "consolidating their positions (in Grahovo) using indirect fire weapons. There is no ground movement of infantry to follow up the indirect fire." [passage omitted]

**Croats Attack Near Knin**

*AU3107185795*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 30 July carries within its newscast several reports on the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Slavisa Sabljic cites Bosnian Serb military sources that "Ustasha units from Tudjman's Croatia have again attacked Strmica, a village about 20 km from Knin, today. The enemy forces used artillery to fire [words indistinct], along the Knin-[Bosansko] Grahovo road, thus confirming their intentions to resolve the so-called problems with Knin and the Knin Krajina with

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weapons and through warfare. The Serb side has no final information on the consequences of these new attacks by Tudjman's army." He says that this is the second day that the Bosansko Grahovo-Glamoc front has been calm and that the Serb defense lines have been "consolidated" and people are "calmer." "New units have been arriving at this front in order to carry out the tasks contained in the order of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Serb Republic, on consolidating the situation on this front and recapturing the occupied territory."

Veljko Bosnic reports from the Bihac-Bosanska Krupa front, saying that "during the day a Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] reconnaissance-commando team attempted an incursion in the Grabez- Grmec Plateau area, supported by 82-mm and 120-mm mortar fire, but it was unsuccessful." He adds that "sniper and Browning fire from Secija," on intersections in Bosanska Krupa "has not ceased since the morning." On the Otoka part of the front "there have been infantry and antiaircraft provocations along the separation lines, but no casualties, and Serb positions remain unchanged."

The studio announcer cites a Krajina Serb military report that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps "continues to attack the defense lines of the Republic of Serb Krajina. The village and airport of Zeljava were also targeted by their fire." The report emphasizes that the Krajina authorities are taking "decisive measures to consolidate the defenses."

Goran Stojanovic, reporting from the Doboj and Ozren-Vozuca fronts, says that "the defenders of Ozren and Vozuca repelled all attacks" by the 3d Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which is "regrouping and bringing in fresh forces from the Gracanica area." He claims that in this town "conflicts between the followers of a moderate and of a more extremist faction are about to start," because of "the great losses" suffered on the Ozren-Vozuca and Trebava fronts. He adds that "Muslim terrorists" shelled "Serb positions and civilian targets in the villages of [name indistinct] and Puracic from the Tesanj area, but there were no casualties, and all the Serb lines are firm and stable."

The studio announcer then says that the Bosnian Serb military has reported that on the Donji Vakuf front "Serb soldiers have made significant progress, inflicting on the Muslims and the Croatian Army great losses in manpower," while on the Vlasic front "in the Galica area, Muslim infantry attacks have been successfully repelled."

Savo (?Kuzina) reports from the Sarajevo front. He says that "the Army barracks in Rajlovac were constantly targeted by snipers from Sokolje as was the Vogosca-Pale road from several nearby locations." He also says that "snipers and Browning fire targeted Grbavica, Dobrinja, Aerodromsko Naselje, and part of Lukavica from Mojmilo and Debelo Brdo, as well as the road towards Pale, in the Vrace and [name indistinct] area." He adds that there was "occasional 60-mm and 82-mm mortar and rifle grenade fire against the above and other parts of the city south and southeast of the city center, closer to Mount Igman, as well as the Serb positions on the Trnovo and [name indistinct] front, but they were unsuccessful."

The studio announcer then says that "joint units of the regular Croatian Army, the Croatian Defense Council, and the Muslim army, attacked the Serb defense lines on the [Bosanska] Posavina front." He adds that on the Gradacac front the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army "used mortars to target (?Novalici) from the Kikici area." Moreover, on the Brcko, Majevica, Podrinje, and Herzegovina fronts "it was calm, except for occasional small arms fire."

He then reports on the situation in western Bosnia, citing Abdic's Radio Velkaton reports that "until this morning" the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps "was attempting to retrieve strategic positions lost yesterday in the area around Todorovo, some 30 km southeast of Velika Kladusa. After taking control of the most important strategic elevation of Visoka Glavica yesterday, the National Defense of Western Bosnia [Abdic's paramilitary group] repelled all attacks." He says that Radio Velkaton reports that "fighting on the central part of this front ceased in the morning and only occasional sniper and small arms provocations have been registered on the separation lines."

### Shells Hit Pale

*AU0108115195 Paris AFP in English 1115 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 1 (AFP)—Four shells hit the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale Tuesday [1 August], according to a witness interviewed by phone from Belgrade.

The witness, who said he heard four loud explosions, was unable to specify where the shells were fired from or where they landed.

Pale, located 20 kilometers (12 miles) east of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, has been targeted several times for similar attacks in the last two months.

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**Serb Offensive, Regrouping Continues in Bihac**

*AU0108103195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor has continued his offensive on the free territories of (?Una-Sana Canton) from the region of the so-called SAO [Serb autonomous region] of Krajina. Here is the latest report from Bihac by Muhamed Mulic:

[Mulic] [passage indistinct] The joint aggressor has been attacking the general regions of (Strzilovo), Pecigrad, and Golubovic most fiercely using all kinds of artillery pieces and tanks. Along with fiercely shelling the front defense lines of the 5th Corps, the enemy is also destroying populated places on the free territory of Bihac (?Canton). On the territory of Velika Kladusa Municipality, Martic's Chetniks have been noticed moving and regrouping from one position to another. Therefore, aggression from the so-called Serb Krajina is going on, although UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] claims that the enemy army is withdrawing from the zone of combat operations.

Two commando groups have been crushed on the Mt. Pljesevica and an aggressor's infantry assault completely repulsed at (Turski Kozjen). The shelling of the 5th Corps defense lines, the Croatian Defense Council, and the members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been stepped up on other sections of the front.

**Gorazde Area Targeted by Serb Artillery, Flak**

*AU0108104895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night, the aggressor opened fire from artillery pieces, flak weapons, and small arms on (?the entire) Gorazde front, both on Gorazde itself and other populated places. As a result of these operations, one person has been seriously wounded. Here is Mustafa Kurtovic reporting from Gorazde:

[Begin Kurtovic recording] With full force, the aggressor pounded the populated places of Vinarice, (Basta), (Trafostanica), and Vitkovici with an antiaircraft gun from (?Drina). The Vitkovici-Mravinjak road was exposed to fierce flak fire from the right side of the Drina River. Strong Chetnik shelling was registered in the section of the front toward Foca, along the defense lines from (Ostanica) to Orahovice. All those operations by the aggressor's army had no consequences, apart from seriously wounding one civilian. [end recording]

Our correspondent said in his report that the aggressor used chemical weapons in the region of Tovarnica last night.

**Muslims Shell Serb Sarajevo; General Alert**

*LD3107132395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1243 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 31 July (SRNA)—A general alert was sounded on the territory of the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo at 0930 this morning because of a Muslim artillery attack on the Serb districts of Grbavica and Vraca launched from the temporarily occupied part of the city.

The Muslims fired four shells on the Serb districts causing damage to buildings. There were no casualties.

Just before the artillery attack, the Muslims sounded a general alert in the temporarily occupied part of the city. This has become the usual introduction to their attacks.

Since early this morning, the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo and the Lukavica-Pale road have been targeted by Muslim snipers and by Brownings from Mojmilo, Debelo Brdo, and Colina Kapa.

**UN Says Serbs Restricting Access to Zepa**

*AU3107193295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Chris Vernon, spokesman of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Command in Bosnia-Herzegovina, today commented on the situation in the Zepa region, saying that UNPROFOR's stay in the region is becoming increasingly difficult and that Serb terrorists are restricting their necessary freedom of movement more and more.

We have been restricted entry to Zepa, where the burning of houses and the destruction of property continues. We believe that the fires [words indistinct] in the villages around Zepa. UNPROFOR's stay is still connected with the securing of a safe passage to the residents of that town who want to be evacuated, Vernon says, adding that this is becoming increasingly difficult considering that UN patrols do not have the freedom of movement to the parts [words indistinct] where the remaining population is.

**Serbs 'Massacre' Civilians**

*AU0108094195 Paris AFP in English 0738 GMT 1 Aug 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Saravejo, Aug 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Army commander General Rasim Delic accused Bosnian Serb fighters Tuesday of wearing UN uniforms to lure civilians out of hiding and massacre them. In a letter to General Rupert Smith, UN commander in Bosnia, he said Serbs in the former Moslem enclave of Zepa, "disguised as Blue Helmets, appealed

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to Bosnians who fled into the woods around the town to come out of hiding and be evacuated." "That way they succeeded in abusing our people, especially the women and children, and massacring them," Delic added.

UN officials say there are about 1,500 civilians and as many Bosnian troops hidden in the hills around Zepa after it was captured, looted, and burned Monday and Sunday. Similar accusations were levelled after the capture of Srebrenica, another former Moslem enclave overrun by the Serbs on July 11, but they could not be confirmed by UN sources.

Bosnian authorities have several times accused the UN Protection Force of "capitulating to the (Bosnian) Serbs" and abandoning military pressure for diplomacy. They have also previously accused UN peacekeepers of giving Serb leader Radovan Karadzic "tanks, armoured vehicles, ammunition, food and fuel," a reference to the stocks taken by the Serbs from UN heavy weapons collection points.

### Delic: Stop 'Slaughter'

*AU3107200595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the mistreatment and slaughter of the residents of Zepa and Srebrenica, the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its commander, Army General Rasim Delic, has today sent a written protest to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Command and Gen. Rupert Smith:

We inform you that in the Zepa region, in front of UNPROFOR, the [Serb] aggressor has started to use the methods that in Srebrenica resulted in a genocide not seen in Europe since the end of World War II. The trips by your patrols to the Zepa region and their appeals to the fleeing civilians via megaphones to join them in order to be evacuated have been used by the aggressor who employed its criminals dressed in UNPROFOR uniforms.

(?They have used) the same method to call suffering civilians to join them to be evacuated. Unfortunately, I inform you that in this way the criminals have managed to lure an undetermined number of civilians, mainly women and children, and slaughter them.

In view of this, we protest most sharply and ask you to take urgent measures to stop the agony of the innocent population of Zepa in a civilized way. We insist that you finally stop giving in to the criminal's ultimata that were presented at the negotiations with local authorities of Zepa, who, because of the direct danger of genocide, are not able to think rationally, devise their own plans for evacuation, or make decisions, reads the protest of Gen. Rasim Delic to Gen. Smith.

### UN Appeals for Aid for Serb Refugees

*AU3107193595 Paris AFP in English 1832 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, July 31 (AFP)—The United Nations made an urgent appeal Monday [31 July] to more than 30 governments to take thousands of additional refugees from the former Yugoslavia, as reports emerged of another 20,000 refugees fleeing the crisis.

"The fierce resumption of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to significant population displacement," the UN refugees agency (UNHCR) said in the appeal for countries to initially take 5,000 more refugees ahead of the 50,000 who will eventually need new homes.

UNHCR said it cannot handle the refugees it must care for already, never mind any additional waves, if the world's governments do not make more provisions for accepting the displaced.

In Bonn, the German government, which has taken twice as many ex-Yugoslav refugees as other members of the European Union, said it would not close its doors but wanted a fair distribution of any future influx. Germany already houses 350,000 refugees.

The appeal came as the Yugoslav Red Cross reported the flight of 20,000 Serbs ahead of the Croatian offensive in western Bosnia.

Up to 7,000 refugees were holed up in the Serb-held town of Drvar, 20 kilometres (12 miles) north of Bosansko Grahovo, which was captured by Croat forces Friday, the organization said.

Around 5,500 others have sought refuge in the Serb-held village of Mrkonjic Glad, 50 kilometres (30 miles) north of Glamoc, also overrun by Croat forces Friday.

Other displaced persons are spread around parts of Serb-held northern Bosnia, and Yugoslav Red Cross official Miodrag Starcevic said medical and aid supplies for all refugees were in short supply.

Croat forces stepped up military activity in western Bosnia in a bid to relieve pressure on Bosnian Government forces in the besieged Bihac enclave while also threatening Croatian Serb separatists who hold the nearby Krajina, about 22 percent of Croatia bordering the Bihac enclave in Bosnia.

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The fallen town of Bosansko Grahovo guards the backdoor to Knin and is an important link between rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.

The figures were not independently confirmed, but UN officials said earlier that Serb refugees were fleeing fighting in regions along the border between western Bosnia and Krajina.

Hundreds more are reported to be leaving the Croatian Serb stronghold Knin itself. "There is a flood of refugees from Knin, leaving in their cars and heading north," a UN spokesman said.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) sent emergency supplies into the region, while the Yugoslav Red Cross and UNHCR also were mobilising convoys to bring in much-needed aid.

UN spokeswoman Myriam Sochacki said there had been considerable mortar shelling of villages over the weekend. Sochacki said activity was focused on border villages and the Serb held town of Strmica 15 kilometers (10 miles) north of Knin.

### 20,000 Flee Offensive

*LD3107161595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1601 GMT 31 Jul 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—About 20,000 Serbs have fled their homes in western Bosnian Serb Republic from the offensive of regular Croatian Army, a Yugoslav Red Cross team said on its return from the area Monday [31 July] evening.

Red Cross representatives said at a press conference that the majority of Serbs from Grahovo and Glamoc had sought shelter in Drvar (7,000), Mrkonjic Grad (about 5,500), and Belajci (about 2,000), while many were heading for Sanski Most, Prijedor, Banja Luka and other towns in Bosnian Serb state.

Red Cross team member Nikola Stepanovic said long lines of Serb refugees, mostly old people and children, were moving along the Petrovac road, as they did 53 years ago (during World War II). Those who used to be refugees then are now leading their grandchildren by the hand, with the sole difference that German planes have not yet started dropping bombs on them, Stepanovic said.

Refugees said that some old people and children who could not get out had remained in the area occupied by regular Croatian Army last Friday, and their fate was uncertain.

Refugees also told Red Cross representatives they saw their homes burn and innocent civilians being killed by Croatian troops.

Together with their reports, Red Cross team members presented to reporters video tapes which will be addressed to international humanitarian organizations along with other evidence.

Red Cross advisor for international humanitarian law Miodrag Starcevic said that refugee families were deprived of even basic belongings, and that the humanitarian situation in this part of the Bosnian Serb Republic was much worse than in western Slavonia, which was occupied by Croatian Army in May this year.

First relief was brought to the refugees by the Red Cross team, its members told the press, pointing out that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had not reacted so far.

### Mrkonjic Grad Houses 7,000

*LD3107132095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1243 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mrkonjic Grad, 31 Jul (SRNA)—Zora Travar, commissioner for refugees in Mrkonjic Grad, told a SRNA correspondent today that so far, around 7,000 Serb civilians from Glamoc have arrived in Mrkonjic Grad, but new refugees are still coming.

According to her, around 2,000 civilians arrived in Mrkonjic Grad yesterday. A majority of refugees have been accommodated in makeshift reception centers, schools, public halls, and portacabins; several soup kitchens have been opened. [passage omitted]

### Aid Groups at Sites

*AU3107143595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[Report by Branislav Bozic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Twenty thousand refugees who have fled occupied Grahovo, Glamoc, and their environs are being accommodated in municipalities of the Banja Luka region, so we can say that the refugees' initial crisis is over. They all, more or less, have a safe roof over their heads, although food and personal hygiene items are scarce. The Red Cross here and the FRY Red Cross branch, as well as international humanitarian organizations, are currently touring the refugee camps, which means that the problem will soon be solved.

However, a lot less encouraging news is coming from the fronts. All separation lines are, to use the expression used here, active and battles are raging everywhere. This

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is most likely the result of assessments made by the Croatian and Muslim military leadership that they can now significantly push back Serbian forces. However, a hasty, additional mobilization is under way in the Serb Republic and high-ranking Serb Republic Army commanders have announced a strong counteroffensive against Croatian forces that have occupied Grahovo and Glamoc.

### UNPROFOR's Smith Meets Serb Army's Mladic

#### Helicopter Hit en Route

*LD3107201795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2005 GMT 31 Jul 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—A helicopter carrying United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander for Bosnia, Gen. Rupert Smith, was hit on Monday with small arms fire and was forced to land in the town of Kiseljak, 20 km southwest of Sarajevo, UN sources said.

Gen. Smith then took another helicopter from Kiseljak and continued on his way to the town of Mrkonjic Grad in western Bosnia for a meeting with Bosnian Serb Army Commander Gen. Ratko Mladic, agencies reported.

"Two rounds of small arms fire hit the chopper and it had to land in (Croat-held) Kiseljak," UN spokesman Aleksandr Ivanko said.

It is not known yet who fired at the helicopter. The Muslim army immediately accused Serbs, but UN sources said the areas over which the helicopter was flying are controlled by Serbs and Croats and that they do not know which side had opened fire.

#### Mladic Briefs on War

*LD0108092395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2044 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Mrkonjic Grad, 31 Jul (SRNA)—Lieutenant Colonel General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the main headquarters of the Bosnian Serb Republic Army, today met Gen. Rupert Smith, the commander of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the resort of Balkana near Mrkonjic Grad and informed him about the Croatian aggression against western parts of the Serb Republic and its consequences for the local population.

Gen. Mladic told reporters that Gen. Smith had been informed about the activities of the Republic of Croatia's Armed Forces and their contribution to the deterioration of the situation in western parts of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Muslims and Croats are trying to justify the aggression in their media by saying that in accordance with rights granted by the UN Charter the Muslims had called on Croatia to intervene as a third country," Gen. Mladic said and added that "the Serb side will exercise the same right if there is no withdrawal of Croatian troops."

Mladic said that the situation in this part of the Serb Republic had been stabilized and expressed his hope that "it will be better in the coming days."

"It is obvious that the war with the Croats is not over and that it will not be over soon," Mladic said.

### Karadzic, Koljevic Brief British MP's

*AU3107182995 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Jul 95*

[Report by Goran Mihajlovic, including statements by Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, in Pale on 30 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mihajlovic] Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and members of the Serb delegation briefed members of the British parliament [MP's], Robert Waring and Lord Harlech, who were accompanied by Princess Linda Karadjordjevic and Mr. Aleksandar Pavic, about the current military and political situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, emphasizing that the situation that has arisen with the Croatian aggression against the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina is very grave.

Members of the British Parliament are here so that, as Robert Waring said, they can learn the real facts. He said that there was a need to find a way to stop the fighting soon and organize a new international conference on former Yugoslavia. My impression is, after these talks, that it is necessary to organize a conference that would deal with the Yugoslav crisis globally, since, as you know, Croatia is also involved in the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the area south of Bihac.

Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, stated afterward that the talks with the members of the British Parliament were political ones, but that they had also arrived to learn about the real facts on the ground, which is what the Western public needs the most.

[Koljevic] Our talks today were political ones, and the possibilities [words indistinct], which is what Mr. Waring was talking about, and at the same time we made it possible for the gentlemen from Parliament to see some of the lines around Sarajevo, as well as visit

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some other areas, that is, the former enclaves, so that they can see for themselves what is happening, and, in other words, to get to the facts that they are missing.

[Mihajlovic] Naturally, the discussion included the Croatian aggression against the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the gentlemen from the British Parliament believe, as their UN officials and Prime Minister Major himself said, that the problem is much more serious than some of their allies think, said Koljevic, and added:

[Koljevic] It would be good to start a solution that would be global and would resolve both the issue of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia and of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina; the global approach is what we believe would lead to the solution much more easily, and these gentlemen believe that history should also be taken into account, since they also believe that history did not start yesterday.

[Mihajlovic] Asked by a reporter whether the Serb side is demanding a cease-fire, the deputy president of the Serb Republic said that the Serb side is in fact offering an overall cessation of hostilities and an urgent beginning of a new diplomatic initiative, in fact, the organization of a new conference on the former Yugoslavia.

**Mladic Visits Drvar, Predicts Recapture**

*AU3107180595 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Armed Forces of the Army of the Serb Republic, visited Drvar today. This is what he told our reporter Milovan (?Bijelac) about the current military situation:

[Begin recording] I arrived here to stop further Ustasha progress and punish them for what they have done to our towns of Glamoc and [Bosansko] Grahovo, together with all our people and our Army. I hope that the operation carried out by our Army and all the other forces in this area will be much more successful than all the previous ones, since we have many reasons for it. The Ustashas will end up in a worse situation than in the past, when they were going for our lives and now they intend to do the same.

The people and the army of Grahovo and Glamoc were heroic in dealing with the hordes of the Croatian Armed Forces. However, now it will be the Army of the Serb Republic that is going to take care of the future and the protection of our people in this area.

I recommend that the people of Drvar, Glamoc, and Grahovo return to their towns and follow our Army. Just keep going forward and not in any other direction. [end recording]

**Relay System Faciliates RS, RSK Communication**

*AU3107190095 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 95 p 9*

[Unattributed report: "A New Relay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The construction of an antenna relay system has just been finalized in the village of Dragaljevac near Bijeljina that will significantly facilitate telephone and telegraph traffic between the Serb Republic [RS] and the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK]. The initial phase has been valued at 700,000 dinars. Work on the second phase is in progress; phase two involves the installation of technical equipment and new digital systems. The work on phase two should be completed in 30 days.

**Declaration on Republic of Western Bosnia**

*AU0108081895 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 95 p 18*

[Unattributed report: "The Republic of Western Bosnia Will Be a Neutral Member-Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina With the Internal Organization of a State Within a State"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On the basis of the results of the first democratic multiparty elections in 1990, the signatures appended to the People's Initiative by 80 percent of voters in 1993, the general plebiscite carried out in August 1994 among tens of thousands of our citizens who took refuge abroad, and the determination of units of the People's Defense to accomplish the political will of the citizens, and in agreement with universal principles on citizens' right to self-determination and the expressed need for the protection of human rights and freedoms, I announce the Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of Western Bosnia.

1. Within the borders of the internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia is proclaimed the Republic of Western Bosnia. Demarcation will be made on the basis of agreement with other member-republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. The Republic of Western Bosnia will be a neutral member of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. The internal organization of the Republic of Western Bosnia will be regulated in compliance with its particularities and the interests of its citizens. Human rights and freedoms will be regulated according to norms and

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practically accomplished according to the relevant international documents.

4. The termination of the political-constitutional crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be accomplished through a political agreement between social-political institutions that were formed in the period between 1992 and 1995, with the help of the international community.

5. The permanent cessation of war and hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the warring factions will be achieved through the agreement on lasting peace, given the guarantees of the international community.

6. The following peace documents, signed in the presence of witnesses, are to be regarded: the Joint Statement signed on 21 October 1993 with the president of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; the Declaration signed on 22 October 1993 with the president of the Serb Republic; and the Statement signed on 7 November 1993 by the prime ministers of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Serb Republic, and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.

7. Government over Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be regulated in the transitory period by a resolution of the UN Security Council or a written agreement by authorized representatives of the sociopolitical institutions.

8. In the territory of Western Bosnia, the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina and those of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia will be implemented, unless they contradict the spirit of this declaration.

9. Administrative bodies of the Autonomous Republic of Western Bosnia will be designated according to the laws of the Autonomous Republic of Western Bosnia within 30 days after the announcement of this declaration.

10. The temporary constitutional law of the Republic of Western Bosnia will be passed by its legislative bodies of this republic within 60 days after the announcement of this declaration.

11. The president of the Republic of Western Bosnia and its bodies will take on the implementation of this declaration.

12. This declaration will be published in the OFFICIAL BULLETIN of the Republic of Western Bosnia.

Velika Kladusa; President of the Republic of Western Bosnia Fikret Abdic

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**Akashi Asks Tudjman To Reconsider RSK Stand**

*LD3107215295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2144 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—UN envoy Yasushi Akashi Monday asked Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to reconsider Zagreb's stand toward Republic of Serb Krajina at a time when there was a danger of a large-scale war, UN spokesman in Zagreb Christopher Gunness said.

Gunness said Akashi had sent a letter to Tudjman expressing deep concern over the developments and warning that the worst could be avoided only by a determined statesman-like move, news agencies reported.

The war can still be avoided, Akashi said, and called the warring sides to begin dialogue.

Krajina Serbs' readiness for negotiations is a significant step for creating conditions for peace that you seek, Akashi said.

Zagreb on Sunday categorically rejected an agreement on reducing tension between Croatian and the Republic of Serb Krajina that had been reached earlier in the day between Akashi and Serb Krajina President Milan Martic.

Croatian regular army troops on Friday occupied the Bosnian Serb towns of Grahovo and Glamoc close to the Serb Krajina center of Knin, forcing about 20,000 local Serbs to flee the area.

Commenting on the Knin agreement, Akashi on Monday said that Serb Krajina was readier now than ever to negotiate with Zagreb, despite the fact that Tudjman had rejected the agreement.

The Serbs are more realistic, Akashi said, adding that he felt theirs was a greater will to negotiate.

**Granic, Iran's Velayati Discuss Ties, Bihac**

*LD3107181495 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Following his return from Mostar, Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati met in Villa Dalmacija in Split Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister. They held talks behind closed doors on bilateral relations between Croatia and Iran, in particular improvement of economic cooperation.

[Begin recording] [Velayati, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croat translation] Over the past two years relations between our two countries have improved. Trilateral cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Iran has improved as well. We want this trend to continue. [end recording]

Minister Granic briefed Minister Velayati on the current situation in the wake of the signing of the Split declaration, particularly on the Bihac situation.

[Begin recording] [Granic, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croat translation] The situation is very grave. Bosnian and Croat Serbs and Abdic's forces have been attacking this area. We really need a great deal of help from the United Nations and NATO to protect Bihac. [end recording]

Minister Velayati said he would inform his president about all this.

**Military Expert: Zagreb Could Field 250,000**

*AU3107193495 Paris AFP in English 1849 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 31 (AFP)—Croatia could command up to 250,000 troops and a considerably increased arsenal, Croatian military expert Karl Gorinsek said Monday [31 July] amid fears of resumed hostilities between the Croatian Army and secessionist Serbs.

In turn, the Croatian Army could face a powerful onslaught of combined Serb forces.

The Zagreb army comprises about 115,000 men. In case of a general mobilisation, which Croatia has never called since its independence in 1991, the country would have some 250,000 men at its disposal, the expert said.

Secessionist Serbs in Croatia could summon some 45,000 troops, plus several thousand Krajina Serbs recently mobilised and sent to Krajina by Belgrade.

The Croatian Army would have the upper hand by about three to one in case of conflict, but the ratio would be reversed if the Bosnian Serbs and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) came to Krajina's aid.

Despite an arms embargo in force since 1991, Croatia has managed to increase its firepower considerably.

The country has some 230 tanks, 600 heavy guns, and more than 1,000 artillery pieces, including multiple-rocket launchers.

Krajina Serbs could retaliate with 200 tanks, inherited from the former Yugoslav army, about 100 troop-transporting vehicles, and some 400 heavy guns.

In 1991, Croatia had only one fighter aircraft, but the republic now has some 20 fighter bombers as well as 17 transport or attack helicopters.

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The entire Serb air capacity, combining Krajina, Bosnia, and FRY Serb forces would be 20 times stronger than Croatia's.

In naval terms, the Serbs would be eight times better equipped than the Croats.

Croat antiair defences would comprise more than 600 guns and air-to-ground missiles.

Should the FRY intervene, the secessionist Serbs could theoretically command 130,000 soldiers, 800 tanks, 700 troop transporters, and 400 aircraft.

**Serbs Report Fresh Croat Attacks North of Knin**

*LD3107115095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1115 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knin, 31 Jul (TANJUG)—Early this morning, joint units of the regular Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council resumed their attacks against the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] in Croatia] from the direction of occupied Grahovo in the Serb Republic, the information service of the main headquarters of the Serb Krajina Army said today.

The echo of artillery and rocket explosions could be heard in Knin itself.

The joint Croat forces are still targeting the village of Strmica, near Knin, on the Knin-Grahovo road.

According to the same source, hundreds of destructive shells were fired on the village over the past 24 hours as residential buildings and industrial facilities came under attack. [passage omitted]

Members of the regular Croatian Army are launching infantry attacks and trying to break through over the Dinara mountain range by infiltrating reconnaissance and commando-terrorist units.

However, all these efforts have been thwarted and one of the units comprising nine Croatian soldiers has been completely routed and destroyed. [passage omitted]

**Lika Coordinates Defense**

*AU3107121595 Korenica Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0500 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the Lika Coordinating Committee in charge of defense preparations and solving all problems during armed combat was held yesterday at the Lika Corps Command. The meeting was attended by the highest officials of the Lika Corps, presidents of Lika municipalities, high officials in charge of public and state security, and representatives of the Defense Ministry administration.

The meeting analyzed the current military and political situation after the Croatian aggression against the territory of Grahovo and Glamoc and the attack on the Republic of Serb Krajina. The participants agreed on the ways of coordinating activities tied to the implementation of defense activities and discussed other problems as well.

**Kordun Prepared for Aggression**

*AU3007190095 Korenica Srpski Radio Korenica in Serbo-Croatian 0500 GMT 30 Jul 95*

[Report by Sinisa Samatovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The session of the Kordun Coordinating Committee composed of key military, civilian, and police officials of the four Kordun municipalities and chaired by Milan Ernjakovic was held in Vojnic yesterday.

Speaking about the military situation in Kordun after the state of war was declared in the Republic of Serb Krajina, Lt. Gen.Veljko Bosanac, commander of the 21st Kordun Corps said that all human and material potentials focus on the defense of this area. Units are at full combat readiness and are poised to respond to any possible act of aggression. Everyone in Kordun must be aware that Croatia is preparing to attack Kordun and that is evident from the buildup of forces in the area between Karlovac, Duga Resa, Ogulin, and Gospic.

Municipal civil defense headquarters as well as other services are also on full alert, and wartime councils of municipalities of Vojnic, Vrginmost, Slunj, and Krnja are doing their share of the work. Kordun is ready for a successful and determined defense—this was the main message from yesterday's meeting of the coordinating committee held in Vojnic.

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**Vacaroiu, Slovakia's Meciar on Hungarian Treaties**

*AU3107150295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jul 95 pp 1, 13*

[Report by Jan Skoda: "An Initiative for the EU Associated States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second day of the visit to Romania by a Slovak Government delegation led by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar started with talks with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. The talks between the two governments' delegations culminated at the palace of the Romanian host, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, with the signing of an agreement on economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic by Economy Minister Jan Ducky and on behalf of Romania by Trade Minister Petre Crisan. A joint news conference by Meciar and Vacaroiu then followed. The official program came to an end at noon yesterday with a reception held by Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

We have found out from well-informed sources that, during the government delegations' talks, the Slovak side offered to suspend the ratification process for the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty in the National Council of the Slovak Republic until the basic interstate treaty between Bucharest and Budapest is signed. The Romanian side rejected this offer.

The Slovak prime minister came up with a proposal for a meeting of the EU associated countries with the aim of agreeing on a joint strategy and coordination in the process of EU integration. In his view, it is necessary to exchange experiences and, in particular, to solve together the problems concerning the legal and economic harmonization with the EU. Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk told us that this conference should take place—on Slovakia's initiative—this year. Based on the unofficial consultations, it is possible to state that the majority of EU associated countries welcome this idea, although the Czech Republic, for example, does not.

The subject of the basic treaties with Hungary, especially the contentious matter concerning Council of Europe recommendation No. 1201, was raised not only at the talks, but also at the final news conference. "Slovakia takes it for granted that the Romanian-Hungarian treaty will not duplicate the Slovak-Hungarian treaty," Meciar emphasized. He said that the attempts by some political forces to introduce minority collective rights and nationalist tendencies into politics were condemned at the talks. Obviously, he had in mind the policy of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania.

According to Meciar, in the case of the planned Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, the issue does not involve whether this will be a "better" treaty than the Slovak-Hungarian basic document, because it is a "completely different treaty from the point of view of its contents." Therefore, it is impossible to set the Slovak-Hungarian treaty and the interests of Romania against each other. The Slovak-Hungarian treaty, according to the Slovak prime minister, "has resolved many historical problems."

Vacaroiu again emphasized that his country "will never agree to collective rights and territorial autonomy, or even to a special statute for the ethnic minorities." He said later in an interview for Slovak journalists that "Bucharest cannot accept these demands, either now or in the future." At the same time, he noted that this was also the position of the Slovak side. Vacaroiu admitted that the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty had "provoked various interpretations in Romania." "We are convinced that what we have bestowed on the Hungarian minority, in fact, goes beyond the European standard (of minority rights—editor's note). So, it is impossible to go any further," declared the Romanian prime minister.

It is also necessary to mention, in a sentence, the fruitful talks involving our businessmen and economic ministers—in the finance (Sergej Kozlik), economy (Jan Ducky), and transportation (Alexander Rezes) departments. Stefan Rosina, the director of the Matador Puchov rubber plant, told us that he had signed an agreement on supplying more than 40,000 tires, worth some $1.5 million, and that an agreement is being prepared for the deliveries of conveyor belts. The representatives of our oil and chemical industries were also successful. Others, for example, Slovak brewers, were unsuccessful on account of the disproportionately high customs barriers on certain foods. In their talks, the two sides also arrived at specific agreements on the means of repaying Romania's debt.

**Vacaroiu Discusses Economy, EU Integration**

*AU0108104295 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 26 Jul 95 pp 1, 3*

["Exclusive" interview with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu by Carmen Radulescu; place and date not given: "Three to Four Years From Now, We May Achieve a Spectacular Increase in the Living Standard"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, would you be so kind as to review the main events of this year, from the government's viewpoint?

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[Vacaroiu] If I were to refer to the first six months of this year, I would say that we have covered an interesting, but also most difficult, period for the executive branch, because 1995 has a particular significance for us. It is the year before the elections, the year when we must consolidate what we have achieved in the 1993-94 period, primarily regarding macroeconomic stability and strive to strictly curb the inflation rate and bring it down to the envisaged level of under 30 percent this year. Of course, it was also a period when we had to work seriously on a number of draft bills so as to instill a more pronounced dynamism in the entire reform process in Romania. I can tell you that, in the first half of 1995, we have achieved most of the envisaged targets. Actually, in the past six months, we have obtained an industrial economic increase in excess of the projected figures.

[Radulescu] Please give us some concrete data, Mr. Prime Minister.

[Vacaroiu] Of course, the current industrial increase has exceeded the figure of 9 percent and, to be precise, it has reached 9.9 percent. Inflation is also below the anticipated level, somewhere around 12 percent, which leads us to believe that we will attain the provisions for this year. Regarding current activities, we focused, as I have already said, on implementing a number of actions and measures launched as far back as 1994, as well as several new ones. We attached great importance to observing our budgetary priorities in agriculture and infrastructure—that is for investments—and we also laid great emphasis on the program of restructuring and privatization. In the field of agriculture, results so far are positive. We will have an agricultural year clearly better than the previous one. When I took over the leadership of the executive branch, the topical question was: "What are we going to do, since we do not have wheat for bread?" Today I can tell you that we have wheat for the next two or even three years. How did we accomplish that? First of all through work, that is, through the effective work of those living in the villages, the agricultural producers. We also introduced new incentives to protect our agriculture. Here, I do not want again make a presentation of the entire mechanism of incentives, subsidies, and credits available to the agricultural sectors for the purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment. Anyhow, this policy has yielded results.

[Radulescu] Mr. Vacaroiu, it is not possible that you do not have some problems as well.

[Vacaroiu] Of course we have problems, and I will enumerate them for you. A first and most important problem—which we have settled in the meantime, after much hardship and many delays, because there have been ardent disputes and big interests at stake—is the Law on Accelerating the Privatization Process, which brings a number of amendments to the basic Law on Privatization in Romania. You know that we are currently taking intensive steps to implement the provisions of Law No. 55/1995. I do not want to elaborate on that. (In its previous issues, DIMINEATA newspaper has presented in detail the latest developments in the implementation of Law No. 55 on privatization—editorial note) I would only like to remind you that we also created new institutions designed to launch the entire process, such as the Agency for Restructuring Trade Companies. One should not forget the fact that 99 percent of everything we are doing along the line of restructuring is done through our own efforts. We do not have foreign financial support for this process.

[Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister, please tell us in a few words what the government is doing in the social sphere, because the cost of the transition period is hurting the living standard of many of us...

[Vacaroiu] I just wanted to move on to this aspect. In the sphere of social policy, we managed to pass the Law on Social Assistance, which will solve a difficult problem, since in our country we have people with incomes below a certain level, which is not enough for a minimum subsistence. By reintroducing the tax for crossing the frontier, we increased the financial possibilities for supporting those with lower incomes...

[Radulescu] Excuse me for interrupting you, but I would like to know, how much is being "collected" from this tax on crossing the border?

[Vacaroiu] Some 80 to 100 billion lei can be obtained yearly from the application of this tax, which is quite a substantial sum. I would also like to add that we are promoting a general policy for economic growth and are concerned with developing and expanding our foreign markets—a direct support granted by the government to the economic units with private and state-owned capital—something that has led to a more than 25 percent increase in Romania's foreign trade volume in the first six months of this year compared to 1994. Therefore, these are concrete results that entitle us to hope that, this year, we will keep our promise of increasing the living standard by approximately 10 percent compared to the previous year. This is only part of our activity, which does not take into account other current activities, such as 30 to 40 government decisions taken each week, approvals for various norms, and various clarifications for the implementation of the laws.

[Radulescu] What legislative projects do you currently have in parliament?

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[Vacaroiu] At this time, we have some 150 draft bills submitted to parliament. Right now, during the parliamentary vacation—the government is not on vacation—we will focus on issuing ordinances to solve a number of pending problems.

[Radulescu] If we continue with this pace in the economy, Mr. Vacaroiu, when do you suppose on an increase in the people's well-being?

[Vacaroiu] It depends on what one means by well-being...

[Radulescu] A decent living standard and a little more.

[Vacaroiu] You mean a decent living standard for the country's entire population—because approximately 30 percent of the population already enjoy a spectacular living standard, I would say—that is, for the great majority of Romania's citizens, provided we manage to preserve the current pace. In the sphere of material production—after all, well-being is linked to the progress of the economy and the increase in production and labor productivity—I believe that, three to four years from now, we may achieve a spectacular increase in the living standard as well as acceptable living conditions for the country's entire population. Therefore, I would call the forthcoming period optimistic, meaning that, even after next year's elections, we should have a government that knows how to manage the marcoeconomic correlations and how to further achieve economic, growth against the background of an accelerated privatization process that should permit substantial accumulations. I am referring to the financial sources that should facilitate such a process of distribution of incomes; that the increase in living standards should reach every single man in the country.

[Radulescu] Should we hope for euro-atlantic integration around the year 2000? If so, what good will it do for the country's citizens, since I know that there are also drastic requirements linked to this integration?

[Vacaroiu] First of all, I would like to say that Romania's integration into the EU is a long-term process. I believe that this process will last beyond the year 2000. I state this on the basis of a number of analyses made. The integration should indeed bring an advantage to the Romanians. This means that we must have an economy, which is prepared for the integration. We will need a privatized economy that can stand up to the tough competition there and an agriculture that can also adjust to the basic parameters required by the EU. Let us not forget that the European market is very restrictive and parcelled out, with many prerequisites. If you are not well prepared in the agricultural and economic spheres, you may find yourself at a disadvantage after integration. For instance, you may lose a part of the economy and simply become a sales market, with little industrial or economic clout. Therefore, the economic leap forward is a target we are striving for and that we want to achieve as soon as possible. In other spheres, such as the political, cultural, and scientific, we believe that we could achieve this integration tomorrow. Regarding integration into NATO, this process may take place somewhat sooner than integration into the EU. In this respect, we are carrying out certain programs, such as those within the Partnership for Peace scheme, and I believe that we can achieve the necessary leap forward that should facilitate our integration into NATO sooner than into the EU. I would like to reiterate here that we are associate members of the euro-atlantic structures.

[Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister, I would like you to comment briefly on the true "offensive" you launched recently in the sphere of meetings with your counterparts from countries in our region and from other countries, farther away...

[Vacaroiu] It is only normal to proceed like that, because this practice is part of the foreign policy established when we drew up the government program. First of all, Romania has a good position in the world, in general, and in the neighboring countries, in particular. This position was gained by us thanks to the balanced and principled policy we are conducting. As you know, we have excellent relations with all the states in the Yugoslav space. We maintain constant dialogue with our neighbors and are directly interested in contributing as much as possible to solving the conflicts in the region.

[Radulescu] Everybody recognizes that we are an "oasis of peace" in the region...

[Vacaroiu] Indeed, this is true. This was also confirmed during our recent visits to countries in the Far East and Asia (Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, PRC, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), which concluded with particular results and with the problems solved even during the visits proper—I am referring to the spheres of economy, cooperation, trade exchanges, and even the consolidation of the political dialogue and the overall relations between Romania and the respective countries. Indeed, as you have said, we are on a permanent offensive to speed up our exit from the profound crisis that has affected Romania in the first three years after the revolution. We are directly interested in opening and developing our country's foreign markets, and I can tell you that we have managed to accomplish that. Let us not forget that, last year, the Romanian exports registered a great leap forward of some $1 billion and we hope to achieve another billion dollars this year from exports.

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[Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister, maybe we will also achieve an increase in the quality of our products?

[Vacaroiu] Absolutely. To this, one should add the need for the economic units, regardless of whether they are private or with mainly government-owned, to realize that penetration or maintenance of a market means quality work, quality and competitive products, and discipline in work. We hope that our actions, which have already started, will be implemented concretely through the direct activity of the companies.

[Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister, we would like to ask you many other questions, but the time allocated for this interview has expired.

**Official on Talks With U.S. Air Force Secretary**

*AU0108075695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[Interview with Ioan Mircea Pascu, head of the Defense Policy and International Relations Department of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense, by Bucharest Radio Correspondent Reporter Dana Popescu in Bucharest on 31 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popescu] Mr. Pascu, let me ask you first to say a few words about [Secretary of the Air Force] Mrs. Sheila Widnall, that is, Sheila Widnall, as a person. You held talks with her today.

[Pascu] Yes, I did. My impressions come partly from her curriculum vitae, which I had studied before meeting her, and from which I realized that she is a first-class expert in astronautics, space research, and aviation issues. Thus, her credentials were excellent. On the other hand, our direct talks confirmed this opinion of mine. She is an extremely serious person, someone who thinks thoroughly without neglecting the perspectives. That is, she is a very solid conversation partner, if I may say so, with respect to her theoretic and professional training.

[Popescu] During today's news conference, she described her talks in Bucharest as very constructive. How would you describe them?

[Pascu] She conducted talks both with the minister [Gheorghe Tinca] and, later on, with myself. As far as our talks are concerned, we reviewed three groups of issues. The first referred to bilateral relations; the second referred to Europe's future security architecture, and the third referred to current issues, such as the conflict in former Yugoslavia. In each of the aforementioned domains, we approached the issues in an extremely concrete way, to the point, without using meaningless words or unfounded ideas. This is what I call constructive talks. We assessed the issues I have already mentioned, after which we tried to establish what we could do in the future in those domains.

[Popescu] I am also trying to make our conversation a constructive one. So what are, very concretely, the envisioned cooperation domains?

[Pascu] These domains were discussed during her talks with the minister. These domains refer to various projects undertaken jointly with the United States, above all the Mil-to-Mil Program and the (?LIMET) Program, which refers to military training issues, our people's studying at U.S. military academies. We also discussed issues related to certain contacts in the industrial field, in the defense industry, whereby we reviewed our potential cooperation with various U.S. armament companies. Similarly, we discussed the issue of the four C-130 U.S. planes. Finally, the last group of issues referred to the works of our bilateral group for political-military issues, which was set up with the United States and which has been meeting once each year, sometimes more often, since 1993. This group is to hold such a meeting at the beginning of the next year, which, however, will be probably preceded by a smaller-scale meeting in autumn this year.

[Popescu] Please say a few words about your talks regarding the plans to include our country in the air space and air traffic control system.

[Pascu] This issue cropped up during the latest meeting of the U.S.-Romanian bilateral political-military work group in February this year, during which the U.S. party made two offers to us referring the initiation of certain studies concentrating on the management of the defense resources, as well as the issue of including Romania, together with Bulgaria, in this jointly controlled space regarding the civilian and military flights. A similar arrangement already exists with the countries belonging to the Visegrad Group, so now the issue has emerged of supplementing this space with Romania's and Bulgaria's air space. This study is about to be completed and its results will soon be analyzed by the experts of the two parties.

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## Federal

### French Officials' Remarks on Terrorism Protested

*LD3107164495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1638 GMT 31 Jul 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia on Monday [31 July] lodged a strong protest to France against French officials' statements which arbitrarily and without any arguments linked the latest terrorist acts in France with alleged Serb terrorist actions.

A Yugoslav Foreign Ministry statement, a copy of which was submitted to TANJUG, said that Yugoslav Foreign Ministry European direction head Milivoje Zagajac had invited Charge D'Affaires of the French Embassy in Belgrade Gabriel Keller and delivered him the protest note.

The protest said that the French officials' statements were irresponsible, that they represented a gross insinuation in the interest of protagonists of anti-Serb campaign and that they were opposed to the interests of peace and understanding.

The statements in question were those made by French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debre and French Government spokesman Francois Baroin, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry statement said.

Yugoslavia rightfully expects that the French officials would apologize and that the investigation results would not be embargoed for political reasons, the protest note said.

### Jovanovic Interviewed on Arms Embargo, War Crimes

*LD3107210895 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1910 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The U.S. Senate's decision [as heard] has been received in Europe at best with a doubtful shake of the head, at worst with loud protests, from Paris, to London, to Moscow. The loudest protestor was, of course, Belgrade. Yugoslav Foreign Minister [Vladislav Jovanovic] received our film crew in his office.

[Begin recording] [Jovanovic, in Serbo-Croatian, fading to Hungarian translation] The lifting of the arms import embargo would be so suicidal and tragic—not only for the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for all of us living in the Balkans—that one should not even talk about it. It should be discarded as a mad resolution which has no place among people with common sense. As far as NATO is concerned, it is again playing with fire. NATO is a defense and military alliance which need not and should not launch offensive military actions, especially outside its territory and without the permission of the United Nations. What NATO has done recently amounts to confronting the United Nations with a fait accompli and to assuming the UN's role and responsibility in the management of a crisis. This is a very dangerous thing on its own, and not an encouraging moment [as heard] in the present situation.

[Unidentified correspondent] What is your stand on the issue of the Bosnian Serbs uniting with Yugoslavia? How can this take place if you recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina? How can this Gordian knot be undone?

[Jovanovic] Look, problems evolved in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina because the Serbs once lived in Yugoslavia, in the former Yugoslavia, which they did not want to leave. The Serbs, however, have been torn away from Yugoslavia by force at the will of the other two state-constituting peoples. That is why they decided to resist a forced uprooting of that kind.

Therefore, one of our conditions of recognition is the settlement of the status of the Serbian people living in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. We think that the international contact group's plan should provide a framework for the settlement of this issue.

Bosnia-Herzegovina could become a kind of loose union made up by two communities. One, the Muslim-Croatian federation, the other the Serbian republic. Both sides would have a right to form a confederation with Croatia and Yugoslavia respectively. I think this could be one way of achieving a reassuring political solution for the Serbian people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Correspondent] The Hague International Court has brought charges against Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic for committing war crimes. Who will talk to them after this?

[Jovanovic] If they denounce the leaders of the Serb nation living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina, they achieve two things. First, they make it impossible for the peace process to progress further, since there would be no one to negotiate with. Second, they would force these people to take an extremist, militant stand, since they would have nothing else to lose.

[Correspondent] After Srebrenica and Zepa the world had to react somehow.

[Jovanovic] Before Srebrenica and Zepa there was West Slavonia, where there was just as much violation of law taking place in human rights, international and military law, and which should not have been

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(?ignored). Before West Slavonia, the Muslims violated cease-fires in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then there were the attacks against the positions of the Krajina Serbs in the protected zones. These were also violations of international military law, to which the world did not respond. When I say this I am not defending the Serb republics of either Bosnia or Krajina, or the mentioned events. I am simply stressing that in this tragic fratricidal war the same expectations must be set against every side.

[Correspondent] What will you do when the Bosnian Serbs ask for your help, I mean military help?

[Jovanovic] First, this is a theoretical question. We would only have to consider this if the events in Bosnia gathered a momentum whereby the result of which would be a physical mass destruction of the Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Muslims and their external helpers. In my view, events are not developing in this direction today, and neither should they be. In this case the crisis would far exceed the situation to which your question related. This would raise the attention and interest in this crisis of numerous other countries, bigger countries than Yugoslavia. [end recording]

**Belgrade To Send Aid to Grahovo, Glamoc Refugees**

*LD3107161195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1555 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government decided Monday to send 30 tonnes of pasta, 20 metric tonnes of cooking oil and 50 tonnes of sugar as immediate aid for the about 20,000 Serb refugees from towns of Grahovo and Glamoc in the western part of the Bosnian Serb republic.

The aid will be sent through the National Red Cross, the Federal Information Ministry said.

The 20,000 or so Serb civilians were forced to flee to other parts of the Bosnian Serb Republic or the neighbouring Republic of Serb Krajina due to the latest offensive of Croatia's regular army forces.

The Federal Government session was chaired by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, the statement said.

**Envoy on Ankara's Bosnian Stand, Bilateral Ties**

*NC2807114895 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 24 Jul 95 pp A8-A7*

["Exclusive interview" with Darko Tanaskovic, Yugoslav charge d'affaires in Ankara, by Umit Enginsoy and Adnan Caglayan in Ankara; date not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TDN [TURKISH DAILY NEWS]: What is the current state of relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia?

TANASKOVIC: Unfortunately the Yugoslav crisis, and particularly the tragic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has negatively affected Turkish-Yugoslav relations. However, I must say that the current state of our relations from the diplomatic point of view, is partly correct. There are correct working relations between the two countries, because there exists a dialogue. And what is very important—my Turkish colleagues also agree on it—is to have channels open for discussion, even though the dialogue keeps a low profile. The channels are open, both here and in Belgrade. I have all the necessary opportunities and all official places are open to me. I have established good contacts with my Turkish colleagues and I think that is very important because the most dangerous thing is for the dialogue to be interrupted. Because if this happens, it is very difficult to restore it afterwards.

TDN: What are the factors that caused deterioration in ties?

TANASKOVIC: Our point of view is that this has happened due to different assessments of the crisis and a different conception of national and state interests at a certain and critical moment of the development of the Yugoslav crisis. Turkey and Yugoslavia took different political approaches to the crisis, although both sides insist they are acting with the intention of helping to restore peace, and to contribute to the peaceful coexistence of all the peoples of the Balkans and a peaceful solution of the problem. Of course, each country has its own point of view, and acts according to this point of view, internationally and bilaterally. But in our case, this gap has been widening politically between Yugoslavia and Turkey. Practically, we are trying to explain to our Turkish friends that perhaps both of us should reconsider and change some aspects of our bilateral relations, and reconsider and change certain other approaches regarding the general crisis in the region.

I think it is useless now to go back to the roots of the conflict, but in our eyes, the mistakes made by the international community at the very beginning of the Yugoslav crisis had really influenced everything

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negatively. This is important, because if you start from a mistaken assumption or position, then you will make other mistakes. And I think now the tragedy in Bosnia is the outcome of a series of mistaken judgements and political decisions taken from the very beginning, perhaps even before the beginning of the crisis.

TDN: What is the Yugoslav approach on Bosnia?

TANASKOVIC: Our position is as follows: The Yugoslav government is supporting the western Contact Group's peace plan. The Yugoslav government, although it is under sanctions that we think are unjust, has in principal supported all the peace plans worked out by the international community from the very beginning. We think that the Bosnian Serbs should have accepted this peace plan, although it is not the ideal formula. Still it is the best formula proposed by the international community up to now. We put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership, at the time when we had relations with them, to make them accept this peace plan, but they did not. And then Yugoslavia genuinely and sincerely cut its political relations with the Bosnian Serbs and their government. The Bosnian Serbs were even isolated by Yugoslavia which is a very important country for them.

TDN: What are your differences with Turkey on Bosnia?

TANASKOVIC: In these two points, there are no differences between Yugoslavia and Turkey: in supporting the Contact Group's peace plan and in urging the Bosnian Serbs to accept it—in our ways, of course, because we have our way and Turkey has its way. But one major difference is as follows: The Turkish point of view is that the Bosnian government, and now the Bosnian-Croat federation, should be treated as the sole legitimate representative of all Bosnia- Herzegovina as a state. Consequently, the Serbs should be treated as the rebel element in Bosnia, Turkey says. This term, "rebel Serbs", is the general term used by television channels, if they don't prefer the term, "Serb aggressors". I respect this judgement as I respect all versions of the truth, but technically speaking it leads nowhere. Because if you treat somebody as a rebel, as the one responsible for war crimes, it is not the best way to push him towards negotiations to find a peaceful solution. The Bosnian Serbs are a very important part of the conflict and the subject of the conflict—I mean Bosnian Serbs under the control of Radovan Karadzic's government.

TDN: There are also the U.N. sanctions on Yugoslavia...

TANASKOVIC: If Yugoslavia is considered as a very important player in the game, if the international community really believes that Yugoslavia could be a constructive element for the solution of the conflict, then it is very counterproductive and paradoxical that we are subject to U.N. sanctions and that we are not the equals of the other players in the game. It is very difficult for our government to explain to its people that at the same time that we are acting for peace, we are being punished by international sanctions. What is the meaning of such a policy? The sanctions are counterproductive because they have led to deterioration in the fields of health, social insurance, economic development and so on.

We genuinely believe, and some other Balkan countries seem to believe, that these sanctions are counterproductive. But the official Turkish policy judges it differently. They still believe sanctions are the only tool with which the international community can press Yugoslavia to act more constructively. The Turks say sanctions are necessary to stimulate us toward launching positive moves. Simply, this means they don't trust us. They don't believe that we are really interested in peace. The international community and Turkey, unfortunately, have supported the sanctions and the exclusion of Yugoslavia from international platforms. The Turks say they generally are not against Serbs and Yugoslavia, but believe international sanctions are the only effective tool to achieve peace in the Balkans.

TDN: But there are questions regarding Belgrade's alleged dream of establishing a "Greater Serbia."

TANASKOVIC: You must know that in the Balkans all nations, small or big, harbor the political idea of a greater, bigger homeland. This exists as a political tradition in all Balkan nations. This is the truth of the history of the Balkans. Idea of a greater Croatia, a greater Macedonia or a greater Albania or a greater Hungary theoretically exists. Some Serbs also have a dream of a greater Serbia, as well. But nobody has a chance to be greater than he or she really is. Serbia can't be greater than it actually is. Any idea of a greater Serbia is absolutely not realizable. Everybody knows this but speaking so much about greater Serbia is just to frighten people. The Yugoslav Government and its Constitution declares that Yugoslavia has no territorial demands from any of its neighboring countries. So, it means, we will stay within our actual borders. Our strategic aim is to keep this Yugoslavia together and to have good relations with all Balkan countries. We will do our best in order to restore peace in the region of the former Yugoslavia where the war is still going on. But one thing to say, this idea of a greater Serbia has been much manipulated.

TDN: But Yugoslavia has not officially recognized the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia...

TANASKOVIC: In practice, we have implicitly, indirectly recognized the territorial integrity of all states that

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emerged from the Yugoslav crisis. That means the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is implicitly recognized through our constitution, because we have no territorial demands from neighboring countries.

TDN: Now the U.N. urges Belgrade to recognize Bosnia...

TANASKOVIC: Yes, now there is a another step, and we are forced to take this step: it is the formal recognition of Croatia and Bosnia. This is a very difficult political decision for our government. First of all, it is not the same situation for Bosnia and Croatia. The situation in Croatia is even more dangerous and more explosive potentially than Bosnia, although this seems paradoxical, because the ongoing war is in Bosnia. But in Croatia there is a deadlock. The Croatian government again seems to be preparing to use force against the Serbs in Krajina. They have already started using force against the local Serbs. Although the international community is officially against that, its reaction to what happened in western Slavonia recently was pretty mild, everybody must admit. There is a lot of mistrust between the Serbs in Krajina and the Croatian government. And it is very difficult for us to consider a formal recognition of Croatia because it seems to us that more and more the Croatian government is using even the situation in Bosnia as a pretext to reach its goal which is, in their terminology, "liberation" of Serb-held zones. In our terminology, this is a blatant attack on the Serbs in Krajina. It is not a matter of borders, and we are not contesting the borders, but the political situation actually with Croatia is very difficult for us. Recognition of Bosnia's territorial integrity is something else. Recognition of Bosnia as a state and its borders is one thing. But we can't recognize Bosnia with its present government for obvious reasons. We think this government has no control over the territory of Bosnia. As (former U.S. Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger recently said, it is not possible to recognize a state that does not exist on the ground. If there had been minimum understanding between the two or three warring sides in Bosnia, I think there could have been a way to recognize it. Then there is another problem, the recognition of Bosnia is now imposed by the international community, as one of the preconditions of the suspension or perhaps lifting of part of the international sanctions. In principle we can't accept this, because the conditions for the lifting of sanctions are not a closed list and increase with time.

TDN: Do you think that it will be hard for you to have the sanctions lifted?

TANASKOVIC: We have complied with all the realistic requirements stated at the time when the sanctions were imposed on us. I say realistic, because there are some points that are completely beyond our will that are related to the war in Bosnia. But Yugoslavia has done all that it could do. But they always have new conditions. Now there is the condition of recognition of Bosnia, and for the next step, the U.S. Congress hints at new conditions regarding the situation in Kosovo, which is our internal problem, for the lifting of the sanctions. We must stop here and say to everybody "Well, we have done everything we could, and now, you lift the sanctions. We can't do everything against our national interests just to comply with all the conditions." Why is the list of conditions open? The logic lies there, and all other sanctions, for Iraq, Iran and Libya, are functioning like that. When you have sanctions once imposed, it is very difficult to lift them. The powerful ones, who impose sanctions, can always add something more to the list. This is the crucial point behind sanctions. However, if there seems to be a minimal positive evaluation regarding the negotiations for peace in Bosnia, I am sure our that our government will reconsider new steps and even the recognition of these two states. But, for now this is not crucial for a solution of the situation in Bosnia.

TDN: What are some other disputes between Turkey and Yugoslavia?

TANASKOVIC: There are also some other differences in our bilateral relations. We think that Turkey is a very important country in the region, with all its potential and with the credit of, I have to say, friendly and even excellent relations with Yugoslavia for 70 years. In our eyes it should and could play a very constructive role in the stabilization process in the Balkans generally. But unfortunately until now, the Turkish approach is a very selective one. Turkey has selected its friends and allies in the Balkans, but on the other side, it does not try to establish or reopen constructive dialogue with some other countries. Turkey has actually very good and stable relations with Croatia, the official government of Bosnia, with Albania and Macedonia. It also has established good ties with Bulgaria and Romania. But in another aspect, highest level Turkish officials say that Ankara is against the formation of power axes in the Balkans. Turkey implies it does not favor a so called Orthodox-Slavic power axis, that is a Serb-Greek alliance with the influence of Russia. But on the other Turkey itself selects some countries in the Balkans as its friends and allies and seems to disregard the other countries. Is this not against Turkey's call for refraining from establishing Balkan axes?

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TDN: And Yugoslavia accuses Turkey of interference in its internal affairs.

TANASKOVIC: If we concentrate on our bilateral relations we just can't understand why there is such a gap between the very positive official statements of Turkey that we share completely and some practical applications. This is Turkey's recognition of the territorial integrity of all states in the Balkans, including that of Yugoslavia, and something that happens in practice.

This can be said to have stemmed from double standards on the problems regarding minorities. That is, the double standards in treating the problems of minorities in Yugoslavia and, for instance, in minority problems if they exist in Turkey and some other countries. As for Kosovo for instance, Turkey officially has stated several times that Kosovo is an integral part of Yugoslavia and that a solution should be found within Serbia and Yugoslavia. This is positive, but represents only one part of the reality.

On the other hand, there is a certain support for the separatist leadership of Albanians in Kosovo and there is some evidence for that. For instance, when the speaker of the Turkish Parliament (Husamettin Cindoruk) receives the self-proclaimed speaker (Isa Ramouli) of the illegal parliament of the non-existent Kosovo republic, that is a signal.

Also there are a lot of so-called "derneks" (associations) in Turkey regarding the Balkans. Their activity is not always or only humanitarian. We know Turkey is a democratic country and everybody can form an association, that is a normal thing. But, generally speaking, Turkey is pressing us very much in international organizations regarding the rights of Kosovo Albanians, the Muslims of Sanjak, and even human rights in Vojvodina.

Take Vojovidna for example, there is no single ethnic problem there at all, even local Hungarians admit that. In Vojvodina 70 percent of the people are Serbs, 20 percent Hungarians. Ethnic relations are very good. Our legislation there regarding human rights are on the highest level in Europe. The Hungarians have radio programs, schools, political parties in Parliament. So why is it that Turkey constantly brings to the agenda Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina, why, what does it mean? In Sanjak, the situation is getting better and better. There is a dialogue established between the representatives of Sanjak Muslims and some other parties in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, the situation is more difficult. In the last 10 years, local Albanian leaders have preferred to take up obstruction in politics. They think it is the right way toward separation and an independent state of Kosovo.

I have information that Turkish officials have contacts with Albanians, discouraging this attitude of separatism. They are explaining that the solution should be found within Yugoslavia. I think this is the right way. Even in Macedonia, there are Macedonians and Turks who feel threatened by Albanian nationalism in Western Macedonia. We think in general that Turkey should have a more balanced stance regarding the so-called human rights problem in Yugoslavia.

TDN: Do you draw parallels with the Kurdish separatism in Turkey?

TANASKOVIC: I don't really want to make comparisons between the two cases because they are different. Somebody from abroad is supporting some Kurdish elements in Turkey. Politically the same thing happening for us. There is foreign support to separatist movements in Kosovo or Sanjak. But I insist that neither the Albanians in Kosovo, nor the Muslims in Sanjak are terrorists, or have acted that way. They are not involved in terrorist organizations like the PKK (the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party). I don't want to compare these movements.

TDN: Is there a PKK presence in Yugoslavia?

TANASKOVIC: Our government is not backing and will not support any terrorist organization. We don't think it would be wise to use the card of any Kurdish movement—particularly the PKK. This is not our way of thinking and we are absolutely against any kind of terrorism. The Kurdish separatist movement has strongholds in Eastern Europe. At the end of the last year, a Kurdish delegation came to Belgrade invited by a nongovernmental organization. They spoke at a press conference and that was all. They left afterwards without leaving any trace behind them. There is actually no presence of any kind of organized Kurdish movement on Yugoslav soil. There is absolutely nothing. There are some countries friendly (to Turkey) in the Balkans where there are some representations, forms of activities of the Kurds. In Yugoslavia there is no such a formation and I hope will never be. It is not our way. it is very dangerous, if you act that way, it pushes escalation. Our global interest is limited with human rights, within internationally recognized terms. But, unfortunately, in the last 10 years this human rights element has become manipulated very much in international relations, with constant application of double, and even triple standards.

TDN: What is the Yugoslav position about the recent Serb attacks on the so-called "safe areas" in Bosnia?

TANASKOVIC: I don't know the exact situation, but, first of all, we are very concerned by the violation of

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human rights that has been occurring throughout the war in Bosnia, particularly in the latest examples of violations of human rights, although we have not exact dimensions. But it is not so important. It is a matter of principle, not dimension. We are very concerned with these human rights violations and human losses.

But from the very beginning, the idea of the establishing so-called "safe havens" has not been a good one even for the Muslims. It is a humiliating way of being treated. What does a "safe haven" mean? It can't be more than a ghetto in the best case with sort of an abnormal life. Also, they have not been totally demilitarized. When the Bosnian government launched its offensive aiming to break the siege of Sarajevo, all the Muslims were given an order to go to fight, just to create more difficulty for the Serbs in other sections. And this was also the case for Srebrenica and Zepa.

TDN: Do you think that there is a strong possibility of a larger-scale war in the Balkans?

TANASKOVIC: Recently, some very important Turkish politicians have warned the world community about the possibility of a spread of the war from Bosnia to Kosovo, to Macedonia and then even to Greece and Turkey. Maybe I am not informed enough about the situation, but I don't know how this spread of conflict is imagined. Why should the conflict spread? Who will be the agent of this spreading? I really cannot understand.

In Yugoslavia, there is nobody interested in the spread of conflict. If the conflict is about to spread, It would presumably spread through Yugoslav territory, but we are not interested in that and everything is against this possibility. Macedonia and Albania can't be agents of the spread of conflict, either. They are still militarily and economically weak. Why speaking so much about the possibility of spreading? How? I don't think Greece and Turkey would take such a decision as two serious states. Speaking about the spreading means the situation is not stable at all in the region and I don't believe that.

There may be two purposes for such a warning, The first one is the pure rhetoric of strong arguments. But the second possibility is more serious. It implies a deep mistrust about the real intentions of the Yugoslav government. Actually here and there we are considered as "mad people, barbarians." We are trying to break this image.

TDN: Are you for higher level diplomatic talks or visits between Turkey and Yugoslavia?

TANASKOVIC: Unfortunately, there are no plans for an imminent visit at the present stage, although we are in constant diplomatic consultations at a low level. We would like to invite the Turkish foreign minister to Belgrade in the shortest possible time. In fact we extended such an invitation one-and-a-half years ago. Last autumn we reiterated the invitation to (former Foreign Minister Mumtaz) Soysal, but nothing came out of that. We understand there are some internal pressures on the Turkish Government. But such a high-level visit would be a signal for the two sides to improve relations. Some Turkish leaders are touring the Balkans, without visiting Belgrade. We want to break this and are absolutely willing for the highest-level Turkish official to come to our capital. In the future this might be realized. Here, I frequently meet with Turkish officials; I have met with Foreign Minister (Erdal) Inonu twice. My counterpart in Belgrade, Ali Enginoba, also does the same thing.

### PRC Delegation Seeks Economic Cooperation

*LD3107185495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1830 GMT 31 Jul 95*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 31 (TANJUG)—Representatives of associations of Yugoslav enterprises and a delegation of China's Ministry of the Machine-building Industry expressed here on Monday readiness to promote economic cooperation between the two countries.

In a talk with the Chinese delegation, headed by ministry adviser Xu Xiaoping, President of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce Mihajlo Milojevic confirmed the readiness of the chamber to help establish business contacts between Yugoslav and Chinese enterprises.

Xu said the Chinese industry was increasingly interested in cooperation with foreign firms, and now with Yugoslav ones as well.

Xu and Milojevic agreed that in addition to the automotive and machine-building industries, Yugoslavia and China should seek possibilities for cooperation in other fields of the economy as well.

In Monday's talk with Serbian Chamber of Commerce Presidency member Momir Pavlicevic, Xu set out that Yugoslavia and China should prepare themselves already now for the period after the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia to achieve direct cooperation between Yugoslav and Chinese firms, without the mediation of state institutions, and for common appearance on third markets.

Pavlicevic said there were wide possibilities for cooperation between Yugoslavia and China in the field of the automotive and machine-building industries and underscored the traditionally good political relations between the two countries.

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During its several-day visit to Yugoslavia, at the invitation of the Lola Corporation, the Chinese delegation will visit several Yugoslav enterprises.

**Belgrade, Bucharest Sign Cooperation Protocol**

*LD2807180295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1723 GMT 28 Jul 95*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 28 (TANJUG)—President of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce Mihailo Milojevic and head of a delegation of the Romanian Ministry of Industry and the metallurgical complex Ian Capota on Friday signed a protocol on the two countries' cooperation in metallurgical industry.

The two sides agreed to stimulate countertrade, contract long-term deals on the basis of production cooperation, stimulate the founding of mixed companies, cooperate on third markets and stimulate scientific and technical cooperation.

They also agreed to sign cooperation agreements in other branches—such as the chemical, oil, machine-building, electronic, electrical, timber and construction industries.

**Rights, Treatment of National Minorities Viewed**

**Kontic: Full Rights Guaranteed**

*LD2807143995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1428 GMT 28 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Subotica, July 28 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said Friday that all national minorities in Yugoslavia were guaranteed full constitutional rights in keeping with the highest standards of the Conferene for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

'Yugoslavia is a state of citizens, and not a national state, it is a state in which all citizens are equal, regardless of religious, national, political and other affiliations,' Kontic set out here in a talk with officials of the Northern Backa district in Serbia's multi-national northern province of Vojvodina.

Kontic said inter-ethnic relations in the Northern Backa district were characterized by understanding and cooperation and could serve as an example to others.

The prime minister pointed out that Northern Backa was recording outstanding results in production and successfully implementing the economic stabilization programme. He underscored that the economy was the region's 'strong guarantee for a successful reintegration into the world market once the sanctions (against Yugoslavia) are lifted.'

**Minority's Condition Praised**

*LD2207141095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1401 GMT 22 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 22, (TANJUG)—Slovakia's Minister of Culture Ivan Hudec said Friday that Slovak minority in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia enjoyed better conditions and preserved its identity better than anywhere else in the world.

Hudec made this statement at a ceremony at the Slovakian Embassy in Belgrade, unveiling a painting by six native artists from Kovacica and Padina (mostly inhabited by the Slovak minority), who had presented it to the embassy on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the arrival of Slovaks in Vojvodina, Serbia's northern province.

All Slovaks in the world can be proud of their community in Yugoslavia, not only for its success in preserving traditions, but also for its ability to live in peace and harmony with other peoples in the region, he said.

Hudec met Serbia's Minister of Culture Dragoslav Mladenovic earlier on Friday, and informed him that Slovakian Government was advocating the lifting of anti-Yugoslav sanctions and expected that all disputes in the former Yugoslavia would be resolved by peaceful means.

**Report Analyzes Serbia-Montenegro 'Disputes'**

*AU2807150895 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jul 95 p 8*

[Report by Vojislava Vignjevic: "From 'Disagreements' to Disputes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the chairmen of both chambers of the Federal Assembly are still in office (on Monday [17 July] Bozovic and Radulovic received, separately, Romanian Parliament Chairman Nastase), there are no indications that the Assembly might meet before the end of July (August is regularly reserved for holidays). In the meantime, Montenegrin representatives have put off the emergency meeting, while in the Serbian Assembly an emergency session is currently in progress. Does that mean that in the "federal house" everything is fine and that there is absolutely no reason for the federal deputies to meet?

Of course, there are reasons and one can speak more and more freely about them, but it is up to the political judgment of those who make the decisions on the

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Assembly's (non) work as to whether or not they will be taken into account. The most recent reason can be found in the unusually severe criticism of the authorities in Serbia "that are impeding reforms and the economic development of the country," published in POBJEDA, Podgorica's official newspaper. The newspaper states that because of the unwillingness of the ruling structures in Serbia to give up its main levers of controlling the state economy, the federal bill on transformation of state property, which would bring about changes in Montenegro, has not been passed yet. The Montenegrin official daily warns that the ruling party of Serbia will not be able to pass a single bill on the economy or its system in the Federal Assembly that does not comply with the market economy without the consent of the ruling party in Montenegro. It is underlined that if the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] is not ready finally to pass modern and internationally proven rules of behavior in economics, Montenegro will not be able to make its first steps into the market economy without difficulties.

Not so long ago Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic announced that this year will be the year of privatization in the republic, where the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS], is interceding for private ownership, unlike the SPS, which prefers state ownership, as is also mentioned in its strategic party documents. This undoubted ideological dispute (if not conflict), which has been going on for a long time, has not been made fully public, at least so far. In all this one should look for reasons why the parliamentary debate on the relevant bill (on the transformation of state ownership) has not been held for almost two years now. Other rulings from the package of economic acts also share this same destiny, although, with regard to the companies bill, there have been unofficial announcements that the two ruling parties have reached some sort of compromise. However, even this bill has not yet been put to the vote in the Assembly.

After all, at a news conference held the day before yesterday the Montenegrin prime minister confirmed that there are certain disagreements with some federal authorities, where the problem of crossing the Yugoslav-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] border was mentioned, as well as some earlier "disagreements" with the central bank and federal customs. He repeated his old criticism of the Yugoslav diplomatic corps, but this time in a very severe form: "We are extremely dissatisfied with the work of the federal Foreign Ministry and in this regard we shall be calling to account the highest officials in this important department." It is worth mentioning his recent performance on Serbian television, where, asked how widespread the demand for separation is in Montenegro, he answered that the idea was currently supported by the Liberal Association and some minor parties that had no great influence, but relations between Serbia and Montenegro would depend on how they would be regulated.

**Striking Back**

Is it possible to find, in addition to the above, any other reasons for the cooling of relations between the DPS and the SPS? Some analysts do not exclude the possibility that it is about a broader context of relations between the two federal units and that the assessments from Podgorica are to be understood as striking back against Belgrade, because of the real fiasco that Montenegrin tourism is experiencing thanks to the decision made in the capital that Macedonians cannot enter the FRY without passports. Even though the Federal Government has washed its hands clean by asserting that it did not make such a decision (?!), the fact that almost 30,000 bookings have been canceled by Macedonians resulting from the decision speaks for itself. This decision was preceded by the ban on selling fuel for hard currency, which was also made by Belgrade.

Speculations about Serbian-Montenegrin relations take into account some earlier statements (for instance, one of Djukanovic's, when he negatively assessed the United Left of Yugoslavia [JUL]) and also some more recent ones. Reportedly, Bulatovic [Montenegrin president] refused to receive Mirjana Markovic, chairwoman of the JUL Directorate, explaining that it was not clear to him why and in what capacity she was visiting him, since JUL is not a parliamentary party. A little later, President Milosevic's wife [Markovic] held a JUL promotion on the eve of a Montenegrin holiday, namely Uprising Day on 12 July. It is also maintained in certain military circles that political relations between the two republics are considered to be so bad that the issue of secessionist tendencies in Montenegro should be seen as even more critical than the Kosovo problem.

To all this should be added that the circles that announced earlier (in late May) that a discussion would still be held behind closed doors (in the presence of the three presidents) on the peace processes in Bosnia and Croatia further consider that they found justification for such information in—no more and no less than—the Montenegrin state leadership. It seems that somebody has given up the (tripartite) agreement, and who is not hard to guess. The session was interrupted, but the obligation to continue it has remained, though it will most probably not happen until the autumn, when the 75 days are up, being the period of the extension of the partial suspension of sanctions (until 18 September).

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In other words, the debate on the foreign policy of the Federal Government that has been demanded in the form of an interpellation by the SPO [Serbian Renewal Party] will not be possible to circumvent, with or without the presidential triumvirate. What it will bring about and whether some additional cracks will be spotted between the SPS and the DPS of Montenegro remain to be seen, and now even on the foreign policy level as well. Until then, here are the opinions of the leaders of the deputies clubs of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the SPS in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly, namely Srdjan Darmanovic and Ivan Vujacic:

"The debate will depend on what will happen with the crisis in the region in the course of the summer. Now it does not seem that there will be any spectacular turns. The information that we are receiving does not indicate that any recognition of Bosnia lies ahead of us. It seems that the situation is somewhat worse than it was," Darmanovic says, and continues: "It is not clear whether the blockade on the Drina is fully functioning, which is what some in the West (the Americans, for instance) are rather suspicious about. It is also not easy to predict Milosevic's moves, which will influence the course of the debate as well."

**Real or Tactical Pacifists**

Darmanovic points out that there is the other side of the question, which does not depend on the situation in the region, namely the way foreign policy is being conducted. It is being conducted by a single federal unit (that is, Serbia, or its representative), while, according to the Constitution, foreign policy is within the domain of the Federal Government.

He thinks that, with regard to peace negotiations, a polarization of the parties will come about: the Serbian Radical Party, the Democratic Party, and the National Party of Montenegro will probably be on the same side, that is, against the recognition of Bosnia, whereas the SDP and SPO will be on the same side: against the war and for the acceptance of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and the Z-4 plan for Croatia. "As for our party," Darmanovic says, "we have supported the recognition of the former Yugoslav republic from the beginning." He adds that he will follow the line of the socialists, if they remain supportive of peace, though one is never sure about this, as it depends on what suits them better: truly to support peace or just for tactical reasons!

According to Ivan Vujacic, the Socialists have adjourned the meeting, and thereby also the debate on foreign policy, in order to win more maneuvering space over the summer. Vujacic says that he does not expect any result from the debate, save for its being held, which is good in itself.

He assesses that the peace negotiations, as a narrow subject, will be discussed only if the proposer insists on it, pointing out that it is too early to talk about any other forecasts (what will happen when the period of the suspension of the sanctions expires, whether there will be early elections, and so forth).

**Financial Indiscipline Risk to Monetary Stability**

*LD3107140195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1221 GMT 31 Jul 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jul 31 (TANJUG)—Belgrade's Centre for Economic Studies (CES Mekon) said Monday that financial indiscipline in the Yugoslav Federations of Serbia and Montenegro had assumed such proportions that it was undermining the country's financial and monetary stability.

Bosko Zivkovic, a CES Mekon researcher, said that the National Bank of Yugoslavia was still holding hyperinflation down but that it had so many debtors that pressure for fresh money was increasing, which altogether could trigger off hyperinflation.

Zivkovic said that financial indiscipline should be urgently checked and that CES Mekon research had revealed that all participants in payment operations were indisciplined, including state and public companies.

Non-operative bank credits amount to between 43 and 45 percent of the total value of approved credits, or 1.7 billion dinars (one dinar is equivalent to one German mark at the official rate). On the other hand, the state and public companies owe about 1.3 billion dinars, Zivkovic said.

Zivkovic said that the effects of the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the central bank were being undermined by financial indiscipline. Money supply is put at 2.6 billion dinars, primary money at 1.2 billion dinars, while the value of approved credits is estimated at 3.9 billion dinars, Zivkovic said.

Zivkovic said it was possible to check financial indiscipline by forcing the state to pay off its debts to the central bank which would enable the bank to increase its resources without resorting to fresh money. Another proposal is to stop an expansion of credits by strictly selecting possible credit users.

Zivkovic said that it was also possible, in case of insolvency, to impose a clause on the immediate acummulation of all debit claims.

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## Serbia

### Vojvodina Hungarian Politician on Autonomy Plans

*LD3007123695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 30 Jul 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM] would like there to be personal autonomy, which is useful for every Hungarian in Vojvodina in the spheres of education, culture, and information. This is what DZVM Chairman Andras Agoston said. Here is a report by Arpad Madarasz from Ujvidek [Novi Sad].

[Madarasz] The chairman of the organization pointed out that the Hungarians of Vojvodina would elect representatives of the institutions of personal autonomy, who would genuinely represent the basic interests of Vojvodina Hungarians—externally, vis-a-vis the Serbian authorities and the arena of international politics too.

The DZVM would like to set up this personal autonomy at first, and via the institutions of this it would try later on to reach agreement with the Serbian authorities on territorial autonomy. [passage omitted]

### Article: Economic Proposals Find No Response

*AU2807193595 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jul 95 p 6*

[Article by Bojana Jager: "Message to the Authorities: 'Restrain Yourselves'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] June is the month of double economic pessimism: Industrial production falls, and prices rise, and economists, for the first time since the introduction of Avramovic's program, according to the Economic Institute, express their complete pessimism when predicting the economy. Only 11 percent of industrial enterprises see their position as good, and merely 1.4 percent of the firms polled believe the economic situation to be good. This disappointment comes "from the illusion that a more generous monetary policy would incite economic activities," and from the fact that a great number of enterprises is used to "the state's raising their morale with stimulating economic measures, and that has not happened in the previous period."

The crash with reality in this July has shown that the planned growth of industrial production of 9 percent in 1995 is no longer attainable, i.e. the coming two months are going to bring the usual seasonal fall, so that after the first nine months the production will hardly reach the level of the last year's average—according to the researchers of the Economic Institute.

### The Bankruptcy of the Social Sector

The poll has shown that the economy reacts to the fall of economic activity with high inflation expectations; nearly 40 percent of companies have had a rise in their prices in comparison to the previous month, and the number of firms which have recorded the rise in prices of raw materials, energy and reproduction materials has been doubled—in other words, those are the companies which are expected to launch another rise in prices. Seventy-two percent of companies report that they do not have enough reserves of reproduction materials, the reserves of final products are also getting thinner, and the utilization of capacities has fallen to the lowest level of 43.5 percent. Such economic activity is "close to the optimum under the conditions of sanctions," which is shown by the deficit of the balance of trade and the balance of payments. No one knows how it [the deficit] could be reduced, because to work more and to export more, the economy needs imported raw materials and foreign currencies, and there is no one to earn them in a situation when 58.3 percent of the companies polled do not plan any export in the coming three months.

On the macroeconomic level—reduced production creates the same, or even bigger, expenses. In the first six months, public expenditures amounted to around 52 percent of the social product, with numerous arrears, which means that public expenditures were in fact even higher. Wages and pensions rise, so that in the second quarter wages rose by 21, retail prices by 20, cost of living by 18, and the rate [not further specified] by 25 percent. The red panic button has been lit, and no one knows where the money scraped up comes from—the money used for keeping the status quo and the illusion that nothing is wrong and that the stabilization program is—stable. The Economic Institute, however, addresses the authorities: "The social sector of industry cannot be revived by credits, including credits for export. It needs a structural adjustment." Miroljub Labus explained what that means. According to him, the social-owned enterprises have not changed their behavior from the times of hyperinflation. Their profit rate is merely 0.3 percent, the social sector is unprofitable, and it directly depends on credits, which it inadequately uses.

Taking this diagnosis as a starting point, the Economic Institute has suggested and submitted to the Serbian Government measures for the stabilization of the economy until the end of 1995. What makes these measures different from the others, according to the researchers from the institute, is the standpoint that the economic policy will do its best if it refrains from "any great action and the salvation of economy" by some new-old stimulating measures, because such conditions can only trigger further inflation. In that context, as Danijel Cv-

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jeticanin explains, devaluation would be another undesirable measure, because the economy does not function under market conditions, the state has no foreign currency reserves to protect any level of the rate [not further specified], and the lack of financial discipline blossoms.

**"New" Priorities**

The objective is still the stabilization of prices and of the rate, and the suggested measures can reduce inflation by 1 percent a month—that is the belief in the Economic Institute. The measures are the following: Keep the monetary mass on the existing level, the new creation of the dinar is only possible when based on the surplus of the balance of payments, otherwise the emission is frozen, and a firm financial discipline is necessary [sentence as published]. Passive interest rates should become really positive, and active interest should be 6 percent higher. In the future, the foreign currencies from the foreign currency reserves would be distributed according to the official [exchange] rate only for the supply of medicines. This year should be ended without a deficit, which at the same time means that there should be no rebalancing of the budget on any level. The participation of public expenditures should not exceed 45 percent, and the economic policy should introduce another golden rule—starting from 1995, public expenditures should be reduced by 1.5 percent a year. The Economic Institute favors free forming of prices, except for monopolists and public enterprises (they do not say who, on our closed market these days, is not a monopolist), as well as free forming of wages, with two limitations—the wages should be paid exclusively out of the realized income, and taxes and contributions would have to be paid as well. The crucial issue is that the structural changes would have to be a logistic support to the economic policy.

At first sight, it looks as though the state got the message, namely that it should "refrain" from any new interventions; Oskar Fodor, minister of industry in the Serbian Government, points out that there will be no spectacular life-saving measures. "The way out of the rigid and rigorous credit-monetary policy is in rigid and rigorous financial discipline," the minister said. But, unfortunately, he added that "the existing monetary mass should be distributed in such a way to stimulate the production in those areas which have up to now been neglected—machine construction, production of means of transport, metal industry in general." Is that not the "unprofitable social sector" that Labus mentioned to us, which needs restructuring, and which the banks will have to support in a "financially disciplined" way in the future.

**[Box, p 6]**

The special one-hour program on the "Measures for the Stabilization of Economy Until 1995"—which is the name of the proposal of the Economic Institute—was not broadcast, for reasons not explained, although it had been announced for Saturday [22 July] evening, on the first program of the Novi Sad Television. Instead, we once more saw the program on the economic development of China.

**Commentary: Martic's Role in Knin-Zagreb Talks**

*AU3007201295 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 95 p 14*

[Commentary by Radovan Kovacevic: "What Are Krajina's Chances in Geneva?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After talks with Thorvald Stoltenberg, the chairman of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, Milan Martic, the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, recently agreed to start a negotiating process with Croatia. According to a short report published by a news agency the representatives of Knin and Zagreb should meet in Geneva.

Capricious and irrational moves that characterized the tumultuous Krajina political scene first led to the loss of western Slavonia and then to the collapse of the parliament. That is why the information on negotiations from Knin arouses the hope that a more rational behavior might have developed. Analysts of the circumstances (troubles) in Krajina have interpreted it as a possible turn. The representatives of Krajina and Croatia could start a dialogue in Switzerland at the beginning of August, which should be followed by negotiations about concrete problems on the basis of the Vance plan.

Martic's agreement followed despite the fact that in the session of the [Krajina] Assembly in Borovo Selo on 18 May, which was held immediately after the military defeat in western Slavonia, he demanded that the part of UN Security Council Resolution 981 referring to economic negotiations with Croatia be omitted; that the negotiations, in other words, be annulled. In light of the daily political events he speculated that if he moved away from the Vance plan, this could lead him to an instant merger with the Serbian Republic. This was accepted by the Krajina parliament, regardless of the warning issued by Borislav Mikelic, the Krajina prime minister, that such a move could be fatal. It turned out that Martic needed the whole show of "merging" in order to oust Mikelic's government, since the prime minister pointed out that the interests of Krajina should not have been put at stake only in order to enable

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Martic to avoid the responsibility for the loss of western Slavonia. The government was voted nonconfidence, which was a consequence of the agreement between Martic and Babic about the split of power in Krajina. It soon proved that Martic's attempt failed, since Pale had more important concerns than to additionally worry about fighting between the cats and dogs in Krajina. In a month and a half Mr. Babic, as the choice to form the new government, has not succeeded in making a list of possible cabinet members yet.

Martic suddenly saw a way out from the confusing labyrinth in the continuation of the negotiations, and this is what his "conversion" from the role of belligerent to the role of peacemaker is about! He agreed to the solution imposed on Krajina, without mentioning the decision passed by the Assembly—on which he insisted—that the talks with Zagreb could not continue as long as the Croatian Army was situated on the Mt. Dinara and in western Slavonia.

**Agreement Was Not Respected**

It is not quite clear what role Martic has really played since the beginning of the negotiations with Croatian representatives. He was president of the Republic when the declaration, called the Zagreb agreement, was signed in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb in March 1994. It should be reminded that that document should have separated the warring factions and granted a long-term truce; apart from that, the platform about economic problems was established and political solutions were announced.

Mikelic's government came later and it only took over the obligation to negotiate, which, in the view of many analysts, it successfully did. A large section of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway was opened to traffic, which sober analysts of the Krajina chronology considered a correct decision. Croatia very much cares about the functioning of that communication, the oil pipeline, the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad, the London-Istanbul telecommunications cable, and the navigability of the Sava River. This leads to the conclusion that it was in Croatia's interest to enable the functioning of that infrastructure, which, by the mediation of the international community, protected western Slavonia better than the 18th Corps!

The above mentioned (inter-state) agreement about the highway should have been respected. The state commission which examined the causes of the military defeat in western Slavonia accused Martic of neglecting the constitutional obligations he had for the defense of the country. It is only natural that the eastern part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which was most heavily burdened by the defeat in western Slavonia, turned against him. This is the reason why Martic urgently called on Mikelic to organize a meeting of his government in Knin, although he had all the time tried to oust it!

**There Is a Chance for Krajina!**

What are Martic's chances for successful negotiations with Croatia under the present circumstances?

Zagreb disqualified him at the beginning: It does not want him as the negotiating partner! Does the Republic of Serbian Krajina have the team and strategy with which it could go to Geneva? Babic seems to have disqualified himself by avoiding any negotiating activity so far (as foreign minister). If the leaders of the Serbian Radical Party are to be believed, he completely relies on "intensive agreements" with them about the forming of a new Krajina government, which should move Krajina even further away from the official Yugoslav policy!

The Croats—including the arrogant assembly from the newly occupied territories, whose appetites have in the meantime grown—and the Krajina representatives, who can expect heavy wrestling instead of a gentlemanly dialogue, should take a seat at the same negotiating table in Geneva.

The chance Krajina still has is not small, however. On the contrary, Croatia must urgently open both the roads and the railroad between Zagreb and Split, it should solve the problems of electricity, supplying of coastal towns with water... The implementation of the Z4 agreement is also a question that will probably be brought up soon.

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